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ABSTRACT 
Ipsita Das: Bargaining Power, Social Capital and Environmental Health 
(Under the direction of Pamela Jagger) 
Environmental health is a huge contributor to the global burden of disease, 
particularly in low- and middle-income countries in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, there is a dearth of empirical evidence on the determinants of behaviors that 
can potentially reduce the burden on human health, time, and education and livelihood 
opportunities. This dissertation comprises three empirical chapters examining 
understudied determinants of environmental health behavior adoption and health 
outcomes, as the necessary first step, prior to generalizing a one-size-fits-all program 
based on anticipated benefits. In the first chapter, in a panel of nationally representative 
Indian households, I estimate the effect of women’s bargaining power on households’ 
adoption of environmental health behaviors. The results show that objective measures 
of women’s household-level bargaining have positive effects on environmental health 
behaviors among rural households. However, subjective measures of women’s 
autonomy have negative effects on the same suite of outcomes. In the second chapter, 
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using the same data set as the previous chapter, I examine the effects of structural and 
cognitive social capital on Indian households’ choice of clean cooking and safe 
sanitation. The analysis demonstrates variation in results across rural and urban 
samples, based on different social capital dimensions. In the third chapter, using 
baseline data from an ongoing randomized controlled trial in Rwanda, I analyze the 
microenvironment factors that affect under-five children’s health. Results show that 
important housing and cooking area infrastructure reduce the prevalence of household 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Environmental factors are responsible for nearly 23% of global deaths, and low 
and middle-income countries in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa disproportionately bear 
the greatest share of disease burden (WHO 2016). The three leading causes of years of 
life lost (YLL), globally, (ischemic heart disease, stroke and lower respiratory infections) 
are linked to household air pollution (HAP), caused from burning solid fuels (wood, 
crop residue, dung, charcoal and coal) in inefficient stoves for meeting daily energy 
needs of cooking, heating and lighting (GBD 2016 Causes of Death Collaborators 2017). 
Black carbon emitted during incomplete combustion of burning solid fuels is the second 
largest contributor to global warming (Ramanathan and Carmichael 2008). The third 
and fourth leading causes of YLL (lower respiratory infections and diarrheal diseases, 
respectively) are associated with inadequate and unsafe water and sanitation (GBD 2016 
Causes of Death Collaborators 2017). The use of polluting energy and unsafe water and 
sanitation also imposes time burden on families, particularly women and children. 
Owing to time spent collecting fuel and water, children lose out on educational 
opportunities, and women on possibly engaging in income-generation.  
There are environmental health (EH) technologies that households in the 
developing world can adopt, and behaviors that they can engage in that not only 
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improve human health but also protect the environment. However, their levels of 
adoption are abysmally low. In the face of multiple challenges of HAP and poor water 
and sanitation, it is critical that we understand not just what EH interventions and 
programs work, but also what facilitates them to work. While many socio-demographic 
drivers of EH adoption, such as income, education, household assets, location, socially 
marginalized status, family size, and costs of technologies have been rigorously studied, 
there still remain many unknowns (Lewis and Pattanayak 2012; Rehfuess et al 2014). 
The role of consumer preferences (Jeuland et al 2015; Orgill et al 2013), women (Miller 
and Mobarak 2013; Pachauri and Rao 2013; Puzzolo et al 2013), peer influence (Beltramo 
et al 2014; Bonan et al 2017; Miller and Mobarak 2015), and non-governmental 
organizations in EH adoption is relatively understudied.  
While the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (GACC) has set a goal of 
encouraging adoption of clean cookstoves and fuels in 100 million households by 2020 
(GACC 2017) to address the HAP problem, catalyzing the shift from traditional cooking 
to clean cooking solutions is challenging. This is particularly true in settings where 
markets for improved energy are thin or non-existent. Therefore, additive solutions 
may be necessary while countries make the clean energy transition. Though there is 
recent literature of the role of ventilation improvements and housing structure on 
minimizing HAP pollutant exposure (Ruth et al 2014; Yadama et al 2012), evidence of 
the role of infrastructure in reducing health symptoms linked to HAP is limited.  
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This dissertation comprises three empirical papers attempting to study 
previously understudied determinants of EH behavior adoption, and HAP-related 
health outcomes. Each paper focuses on advancing understanding of the household and 
community processes that could assist or hinder EH: from understand decision-making 
of women and community involvement and how they relate to household take-up of 
environment and health-improving behaviors, to infrastructural factors that reduce 
under-five children’s HAP-related health symptom prevalence. In totality, these papers 
examine ways in which EH programs can be used to encourage uptake of interventions, 
and potentially drive sustained and exclusive use in the long-run.  
With the sustainable development agenda reinforcing the central role of women 
in achieving goals for clean water and sanitation (SDG 6), and clean energy for all (SDG 
7), there is a need for establishing ways in which women can catalyze change. In my 
first chapter, using nationally representative household-level panel data from the 2005 
and 2012 rounds of the India Human Development Survey, I examine whether women’s 
bargaining power explains household adoption of EH behaviors. Using household fixed 
effects models, I find significant positive effects of women’s co-ownership of bank 
account on likelihood of household adoption of clean cooking, toilets and drinking 
water treatment in rural areas. Women’s co-ownership of house or rental agreement 
also has significant positive impacts on rural households’ likelihood of clean cooking 
and handwashing with soap. However, there are no significant results in the urban 
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sample. With the Indian Government’s recent programs on expanding financial 
inclusion, accelerating liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) provision, and strengthening 
previous sanitation schemes, this paper provides guidance on policy levers that can 
enhance women’s agency, and increase EH behaviors that improve human well-being. 
Community cohesion is a collective asset that can have positive externalities, as 
evidenced in the impact of social networks on various development, health and 
agricultural outcomes. Their role in facilitating adoption of EH interventions is, 
however, not well-understood. In Chapter Two, using the same data set as my first 
chapter, I examine whether structural and cognitive social capital enable or limit 
household adoption of EH technologies in India. I find strong positive effects of linking 
and bridging social capital on household choice of clean cooking, but strong negative 
effects of political participation and bonding social capital on clean cooking. Consistent 
with the broader development literature, bonding social capital and social cohesion 
have strong positive effects on household adoption of toilets. These results vary by 
geographic location, underscoring the need for governments to leverage different social 
structures in EH programs.  
Exposure to HAP from cooking and heating with solid fuels is a major risk factor 
for morbidity and mortality in sub-Saharan Africa. Children under five are particularly 
at risk for acute lower respiratory infection. In Chapter Three, along with my co-
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authors, Joseph Pedit, Sudhanshu Handa and Pamela Jagger, I use baseline data from a 
randomized controlled trial evaluating a household energy intervention in Gisenyi, 
Rwanda to investigate the role of the microenvironment as a determinant of children’s 
HAP-related health symptoms. We examine the association between likelihood of HAP-
related health symptom prevalence and characteristics of the microenvironment, 
including: dwelling and cooking area structure; distance to nearest road; and tree cover. 
We find that children residing in groups of enclosed dwellings, in households that cook 
indoors, and in households proximate to tree cover, are significantly more likely to 
experience symptoms of respiratory infection, illness with cough and difficulty 
breathing. On the other hand, children in households with cemented floors and 
ventilation holes in the cooking area, are significantly less likely to experience the same 
symptoms. Our findings suggest that in addition to promoting increased access to clean 
cooking technologies, there are important infrastructure and microenvironment-related 
interventions that mitigate HAP exposure.  
In summary, my thesis has important policy implications. Our understanding of 
intra-household decision-making on EH adoption is limited; I demonstrate that 
objective measures of women’s bargaining, such as co-ownership of a bank account and 
house or rental agreements, have a positive role to play in EH behavior adoption. These 
results coincide with the wider global policy landscape, and specific policies in India 
aimed at increasing financial access to the previously unbanked, increasing LPG 
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provision and promoting safe sanitation. In examining different dimensions of social 
capital, I show that existing social groups and institutions at the community level can 
initiate positive EH behavior change. This information finds resonance in existing 
group-based programs in India on child nutrition and rural health. Finally, in 
presenting evidence that key housing and cooking area structural factors are related 
with child health symptoms, there is scope for infrastructure-related policy 
interventions. In each of these study settings, these research insights can enhance EH 
behavior change and contingent on exclusive and sustained use, improve human 
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CHAPTER 2: WOMEN’S BARGAINING POWER AND HOUSEHOLD ADOPTION 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH BEHAVIORS: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA 
Introduction 
The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) fifth Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG 5), aims to promote gender equality not just as a human right 
but as being central to sustainable development. There is recognition that female 
empowerment1 has multiplier effects at the household and societal levels, across 
various domains. The realization of SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation) and SDG 7 
(affordable and clean energy) is closely tied to SDG 5. Gender relations and the 
transformation of the energy system, especially for the 1.1 billion without electricity 
access and approximately 3 billion people without access to clean cooking, are 
interrelated (Clancy 2016). While renewable energy and energy efficiency projects have 
a major role to play in increasing energy access, they are likely to be more effective 
when accounting for equality of gender (Rojas et al 2011). In addition to facilitating the 
clean energy transition, women can also benefit in many ways from investments in the 
                                                          
1Kabeer (1999) defines empowerment as a dynamic process comprising three phases: (1) status quo 
referring to initial endowments, rights over resources and household decision-making; this also includes 
voting rights or traditional norms (2) increase in agency resulting from reforms and changing social 
norms (e.g. land titling, land inheritance rights) (3) achievements in the form of responding to new 
agency for the welfare of the woman and others.  
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energy sector, through inclusion in formal sector employment, and livelihood 
opportunities in micro- and small-scale enterprises, including those in renewable 
energy supply chains (Shankar et al 2015). As approximately 2.3 billion people lack a 
basic sanitation service, and 844 million people lack a basic drinking water service 
(WHO and UNICEF 2017), women and their families stand to gain from water, 
sanitation and hygiene (WaSH) improvements through reduced time burden, 
opportunities for education and paid work, and reduction in adverse health 
consequences and nutritional deficiencies (Global Burden of Disease 2016 Causes of 
Death Collaborators 2017; Montgomery and Elimelech 2007; Nelson and Kuriakose 
2017; Rehfuess 2006; WHO and UNICEF 2017).  
  Despite recognition of the critical role of women in achieving development 
outcomes (e.g. children’s educational investments, survival rates, nutrition, 
anthropometrics; food budget shares; agricultural production), there is a dearth of 
empirical evidence examining women’s bargaining power in relation to household 
choice of clean energy and WaSH. Much of the empirical literature assumes that the 
only bargaining is between spouses, and other members are assumed to have a passive 
role within households (Doss 2013; Pachauri and Rao 2013). As the latest sustainable 
development agenda emphasizes universal access to clean energy, clean water and 
sanitation, and the role of women in accelerating this transition, it is particularly 
important to understand bargaining within households in a country where 64% of the 
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population uses solid fuels for cooking (GACC 2016) and 524 million people still 
practice open defecation (UNICEF 2017). As per the latest India-specific Global Burden 
of Disease (GBD) estimates, air pollution and unsafe WaSH were the leading 
environmental risk factors for disability-adjusted life years in 2016 (Dandona et al 2017). 
Using a nationally representative panel (between 2005 and 2012) of rural and 
urban Indian households, this paper examines the relationship between women’s 
bargaining power and adoption of environmental health (EH) behaviors. Decision-
making within households, especially in a joint family system as is common in India, is 
a “culmination of negotiation between different household members” (Richards et al 
2012). In considering women’s decision-making in the household vis-à-vis their 
husbands, and senior male and female household members, this paper is a departure 
from previous studies on the binary assessment of gender roles in a single dimension of 
power relations. Specifically, I include women’s control over resources (sole or joint 
ownership with a household member of a bank account or house) and perceived 
autonomy in the household (survey-based score). Using both objective indicators about 
control in household resources and a subjective measure of perceived decision-making 
power, allows for a more complete characterization of women’s bargaining power 
within households by illuminating potential channels. As for the outcomes, this paper 
acknowledges the synergies between energy and related fields of WaSH  (Ferroukhi et 
al 2015), and thus considers EH technologies (clean cooking i.e. non-biomass stove and 
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liquefied petroleum gas or LPG cooking fuel, toilets and piped drinking water) as well 
as WaSH behaviors (drinking water treatment and handwashing with soap after 
defecation). Women’s influence over EH behaviors is likely to vary depending on their 
access to these services. There are stark differences between rural and urban India in the 
provision of water and sanitation2 services, and access to energy3. Recognizing this 
heterogeneity and that over 69% of India’s population resides in rural areas, this paper 
separates analyses for rural and urban households. 
To preview results, models with household fixed effects show that women’s co-
ownership of a bank account positively affects households’ likelihood of adopting clean 
cooking, toilets and drinking water treatment in the rural sample. Likewise, female co-
ownership of house/rental agreement positively affects likelihood of adoption of clean 
cooking and handwashing with soap among rural households. Autonomy score, 
surprisingly, has negative effects on most EH behaviors, suggesting feelings of 
                                                          
2According to the 2011 Census Survey of India, 47% of Indian households have a water source within 
their house premises (35% in rural and 71% in urban areas) and, 36% rural households collect drinking 
water from a source within 500 meters of the house compound, while the same percentage of urban 
households collect drinking water from a source within 100 meters of their premises. While over 81% 
urban households have a latrine facility, only 31% rural households have a latrine; the national average is 
47%.  
 
3Over 93% urban households are electrified, while only 55% rural households have electricity, with a 
national average of 67% household electrification. A meagre 12% rural Indian households use clean 
cooking energy (LPG, electricity, biogas), while over 66% urban households use the same; national 
average is 29% (Census of India 2011).  
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autonomy might not be a good proxy for decision-making power, while effective 
control of resources is.  
Over the last three years, there have been some policy changes at the national 
level in India, intended to address these EH and related social challenges. The Jan Dhan 
Yojana (People Money Scheme), launched in August 2014, aims to extend financial 
services (banking, savings and deposit accounts, remittance, credit, insurance, pension) 
to the previously unbanked across rural and urban India. This financial inclusion 
scheme has the potential to benefit women with previously no bank accounts. 
Restructuring India’s previous clean sanitation program, the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan 
(Clean India Mission), launched in October 2014, aims to eliminate open defecation 
through construction of toilets; demand creation through increased information, 
education and communication; strengthening of delivery mechanisms, and monitoring 
outputs (toilet construction) and outcomes (toilet use). Subsequently, in November 
2014, the Government of India (GoI) modified and relaunched the previous national 
government’s Pratyaksha Hastaantarit Labh (PAHAL) scheme (also known as the Direct 
Benefit Transfer of LPG), wherein LPG subsidy is transferred directly to consumers’ 
bank accounts, restricting the role of middlemen in LPG subsidy distribution.  
The GoI has envisioned creation of a secure and seamless digital payments 
infrastructure that links the Jan Dhan Yojana, universal biometric identification (Aadhaar 
card) and mobile phone numbers to provide direct subsidy transfers. Programs like 
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PAHAL have shifted fuel subsidy payments directly to people’s accounts, allowing LPG 
sale at market rates. The ‘Give It Up’ campaign started in March 2015 aimed to motivate 
better-off consumers to voluntarily give up their subsidy and introduce direct transfer 
of the LPG subsidy to households that previously could not afford LPG. In May 2015, 
under the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana, the GoI committed to providing 50 million 
LPG connections in three years. Around the same time (January 2015), the government 
also launched the ‘Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao’ (Save Daughter, Educate Daughter) scheme 
that is targeted at the declining child sex ratio and connected issues of women’s 
empowerment over a life cycle continuum. Components of this scheme include 
awareness campaigns and interventions comprising first trimester registration of 
pregnancies, institutional deliveries, and prohibition of sex-determination.  
In light of these six major policy reforms, this paper aims to provide guidance on 
effective policy levers that can improve women’s positions in society, enhance clean 
cooking and related EH behavior adoption, and achieve human capital-improving 
outcomes in the long-run. This paper is particularly relevant given recent research that 
argues for the inability to leverage gender differences in preferences regarding 
improved cookstoves (ICS) adoption if there is no wider social change that allows 
women to exert their choices in household resource use (Miller and Mobarak 2015; 




The unitary model of the household assumes it to be a single consumption unit, 
where the distribution of income or other bargaining power indicators do not impact 
outcomes (Becker 1991). In the alternative collective model, husbands and wives are 
individual decision-makers, and following the “sharing rule”-a function of prices, 
household income, sex ratios etc.-, resources are distributed among spouses (Chiappori 
1992, Chiappori et al 2002). However, multimember households have varying dynamics 
and differing resource allocation affects outcomes (Doss 2013). Unequal social norms 
and practices shape men’s and women’s behavior differently and asymmetrically 
(Goetz 1997; Van Staveren and Odebode 2007). Three dimensions of bargaining 
discussed in the literature include (a) bargaining over objects, e.g. unpaid labor division 
regarding cooking and child care; (b) endogenous preferences of men and women 
formed by beliefs and expectations; and (c) ways of communication and negotiation 
that demonstrate bargaining agency (Agarwal 1997; Kabeer 1999; Sen 1990).  
Studies have argued for female ownership of land, property and assets, and 
access to cable television as a source of female autonomy and bargaining power 
(Agarwal 1994, 1997; Allendorf 2007; Anderson and Eswaran 2009; Jensen and Oster 
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2009; Kabeer 1999; Mishra and Sam 2016)4. Increasing women’s access to financial 
resources (e.g. commitment savings products, microloans and household expenditures) 
increases their self-reported decision-making, ownership of female-specific durables 
(Ashraf, Karlan and Win 2010)5, household assets and incomes (Garikipati 2008; 
Prennushi and Gupta 2014)6, household food budget shares (Porter 2016), and their 
children’s education and nutrition outcomes (Attanasio and Lechene 2002; Doss 2006; 
Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Menon, Van Der Meulen Rodgers and Nguyen 2014; 
Quisumbing and de la Briere 2000; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000; Rubalcava, Teruel 
and Thomas 2009).  
Through improvements in bargaining power, women’s ownership of land and 
other immovable assets could encourage their economic development and enable their 
households to recover from economic shocks (Agarwal 1994, Deere and Doss 2006, 
Peterman 2011). Land allocation and inheritance reforms significantly increase girls’ 
                                                          
4Jensen and Oster (2009) create a single autonomy measure, ranging from 0 to 1, by averaging the values 
of six variables (household decision-making about obtaining healthcare for oneself, purchasing major 
household items, whether or not to visit/stay with family members/friends; permission from husband to 
visit the market, visit friends/relatives; whether women were allowed to keep money aside to spend as 
they desire), where higher values indicate more autonomy.  
 
5Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2010) create an index of women’s sole or joint decision-making power by taking 
an equally weighted mean of women’s responses to 9 decision-making questions. 
 
6Garikipati (2008) defines women as ‘empowered’ if they have a positive score on three or more of the 
following indicators: ownership of household assets or incomes, control over minor finances, control over 





education attainment (Deininger et al 2013) and weight-for-age (Wang 2014), women’s 
autonomy7 (Mookerjee 2017), upkeep of soil conservation activities, particularly for 
female-headed households (Ali, Deininger and Goldstein 2014), and security of tenure, 
agricultural investments and women’s engagement in agriculture decisions (Santos et al 
2014). Increase in women’s household bargaining power, owing to other exogenous 
changes has been empirically found to positively impact numerous development 
outcomes. Pensions received by women in South Africa had a higher impact on girls’ 
anthropometrics (height for age, weight for height) but no significant impact on boys’ 
health status (Duflo 2003). Increase in hours worked by adult women and educational 
investments in children, resulted from changes in marriage law in Brazil that provided 
alimony rights and duties to cohabiting couples (Rangel 2006). There is also evidence 
from China that increasing female agricultural income increases survival rate for girls 
and children’s education attainment (Qian 2008). More recently, Kalsi (2017) 
demonstrates the positive impact of female political seat reservation on higher birth 
order girls’ survival, after implementation of state-level female political seat 
reservations in India. 
In the agriculture sector, there are differences by gender in crop choices and 
labor divisions that vary by geography (FAO and IFPRI 2014). There is evidence of 
                                                          
7Mookerjee (2017) measures autonomy using binary variables for two questions on women’s mobility and 
seven questions on women’s joint or sole decision-making in the household.  
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increase in agricultural production owing to individual’s political hierarchy position 
(Goldstein and Udry 2008), and gender differences in access to agricultural inputs 
affecting adoption of improved crop technology (Doss and Morris 2000). Differences in 
agricultural input adoption result from households’ awareness of land rights 
(Deininger, Ali and Yamano 2008) and access to credit and cash (Gladwin 2002). There 
is also evidence to the contrary: women’s participation at multiple levels of decision-
making may not necessarily have positive environmental and development outcomes 
(Mwangi et al 2011).  
Proxies for women’s status (e.g. secondary school enrollment, contraceptive 
prevalence rate, fertility rates, female labor participation, male first child, intra-
household influence) have been used to predict use of solid fuels (Austin and Mejia 
2017), household biomass energy per capita (Burke and Dundas 2015), clean fuels 
(Kishore and Spears 2014), and non-biomass chimney stoves (Mohapatra and Simon 
2015)8. Among the few randomized controlled trials (RCTs) conducted on clean 
cooking, there is evidence of women’s higher preferences for ICS but low decision-
making authority over purchases (Miller and Mobarak 2013). While rural Ethiopian 
                                                          
8Mohapatra and Simon (2015) use an ordered variable for women’s intra-household role, wherein women 
decide alone, in consultation with men, men decide but consult women and men decide alone on what 






women’s intra-household bargaining power9 increases households’ willingness to pay 
(WTP) for ICS (Hassen et al 2015), female-headed rural Indian households and female 
respondents have lower WTP for ICS (Jeuland et al 2015). There is need for aiming ICS 
promotional campaigns at both women and men to increase overall household WTP, 
since men usually have higher control over expenditures and control decisions relating 
to purchase of a new technology (Puzzolo et al 2013). The reverse is also possible: in 
households where women’s status is higher, women may still choose to sacrifice 
investing in products or technologies that improve their well-being in favor of spending 
on resources that improve the well-being of the household (World Bank 2015). Existing 
literature ignores women’s bargaining power with respect to access to energy resources, 
possibly because most improved energy interventions provided to households have 
either been heavily subsidized or are free (Pachauri and Rao 2013).  
Studies in the WaSH sector argue for women’s involvement in the development 
and sustenance of WaSH interventions (Hoque et al 1994; Pardeshi 2009; Smith et al 
2004; Wilson and Chandler 1993). RCT studies find that participatory women’s groups 
lead to significant decreases in under-five morbidities from fever and acute respiratory 
infections (Younes et al 2014), and social marketing sanitation campaigns targeted to 
households with marriageable-age boys, significantly increase toilet coverage, 
                                                          
9Hassen et al (2014) use nine survey measures of decision-making asked both to husbands and wives. 
Autonomy index created from these nine measures is instrumented with number of surviving adult male 
siblings and spouses’ birth order.  
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particularly in marriage markets where women were scarce (Stopnitzky 2016). Latrine 
ownership in India is associated with married women in the household (Coffey, Spears 
and Vyas 2017), and women’s access to radio and television ownership (Lee 2017); 
qualitative evidence finds women’s non-involvement in sanitation-related decision-
making owing to their low socio-economic position and incapacity to affect household’s 
financial decisions (Routray et al 2017). However, not many sanitation intervention 
studies consider cultural factors (Garn et al 2016).  
As discussed above, the quantitative evidence of the effect of women’s 
empowerment on household choice of EH behaviors is limited and inconclusive, and 
does not reflect a representative sample of populations. The data and setting used in 
this paper provide an opportunity to rigorously test this hypothesis.  
Data 
This paper uses data from the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS), 
conducted by the University of Maryland, College Park and the National Council for 
Applied Economic Research, New Delhi, India (Desai and Vanneman 2005, 2011-12). 
IHDS-I (collected in 2004-05) is a nationally representative survey of 41,554 households 
in 1,503 villages and 971 urban neighborhoods across India. IHDS-II (collected in 2011-
12) re-interviewed a majority of these households (42,152). A three-stage clustered 
sampling design was used to select the IHDS sample. Both rounds of data contain 
detailed information on household and individual socioeconomic and demographic 
 
21 
factors, education, household farm, livestock, wage and salary work, non-farm 
business, income, and household consumption. The women’s questionnaire, 
administered privately to ever-married women in the age group of 15-49 years, 
collected data on water, sanitation, fuel and energy use in the household, short term 
and major morbidity, gender relations, marital and fertility history, natal care and 
anthropometry. IHDS-I interviewed only one eligible woman in each household for 
detailed questions in the women’s questionnaire. For IHDS-II, the same eligible woman 
from IHDS-I was interviewed, if she was still part of the household, or another eligible 
woman if not, and a second eligible female if available. I restrict the panel to households 
and women that were present in both rounds. This paper uses balanced panel data of 
49,892 observations (24,946 households from each IHDS round) and Table 2.1 shows the 
rural-urban and zone-wise analytic sample split.  
Measures 
The five outcomes of interest at the household-level fall under two broad 
categories: (A) EH technologies and (B) WaSH behaviors. Three EH technologies I 
consider are: (1) clean cooking energy (use of non-biomass stove and LPG cooking fuel); 
(2) toilets; and (3) piped drinking water inside the dwelling. Eligible women were asked 
which type of stove the household used. For each type of fuel (fuelwood, animal dung, 
crop residue, kerosene, LPG and coal/charcoal), eligible women were asked (a) whether 
the household used it for cooking, heating, lighting or a combination of energy services, 
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(b) where they were procured from, and (c) how much did they pay for what was used 
in the 30 days prior to the survey. Using these two questions on household choice of 
stove and fuel, I create a clean cooking energy variable for households that did not use a 
biomass stove and used LPG fuel for cooking. Women were asked whether the 
household has a toilet facility of its own and what type (traditional pit latrine, 
ventilated improved pit latrine or flush toilet). I combine the three toilet types to a 
single category for whether the household has any type of toilet (coded 1, 0 if household 
practices open defecation) to create a binary variable. Women were also asked about the 
household’s main source of drinking water. I create a binary variable for whether the 
household has piped drinking water access (coded 1) or other sources i.e. tube well, 
hand pump, dug open well or covered well (coded 0).  
Two WaSH behaviors analyzed in this paper are: (1) drinking water treatment 
and (2) handwashing with soap after defecation. Households were asked if during a 
regular week, they ever treated or purified drinking water by boiling, filtering with a 
purchased filter, using Aquaguard (branded advanced water purifier) or by adding 
chemicals (straining with cloth or strainer were excluded). I create a binary variable for 
drinking water treatment, where 1 was coded if households responded ‘always treated’ 
and 0 for other responses. Eligible women were also asked about their handwashing 
practices; here again I create a binary variable that is coded 1 if women respond ‘wash 
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hands with soap after defecation’ and 0 if responses are ‘no handwashing, or 
handwashing with water alone or mud/ash.  
The three main explanatory variables are proxies for women’s bargaining power: 
(1) sole/joint bank account ownership; (2) sole/joint house ownership/rental paper 
agreement; and (3) autonomy score10. Women were first asked if anyone in their family 
has a bank account, and if so if they have their name on any of these bank accounts. 
Using these two questions, I create a binary variable coded 1 if women respond ‘Yes’ to 
having their name on a bank account and 0 if either the woman does not have her name 
on a bank account or if the household does not have a bank account. Women were then 
asked if they have their name on the ownership or rental papers for their house. I create 
a binary variable coded 1 if women respond ‘Yes’ and coded 0 if women respond ‘No’ 
or if the household does not own a house or have rental papers.  
Women’s autonomy in the household is a composite score measured by 
averaging the score of women’s responses to 9 questions indicative of their autonomy in 
the household [similar to Jensen and Oster (2009) and Ashraf, Karlan and Win (2010)]. 
A higher score on each of the questions indicates higher autonomy. Eligible women 
were asked who in the family decides (a) what to cook on a daily basis, (b) whether to 
buy an expensive item such as a TV or fridge, (c) how many children to have, (d) what 
                                                          




to do if a child falls sick, (e) whom their children should marry; and who has most say 
in making these decisions. For each of these variables, I assign a score of 3 if women are 
the sole decision maker, 2 if women make a joint decision with other household 
members, 1 if women have a say in decision-making but are not the main decision 
makers, and 0 if women have no say and other household members decide. The 
women’s questionnaire captures information on whether eligible women have to ask 
permission of their husband or senior family member to go to (a) the local health center, 
(b) the home of relatives or friends in the village or neighborhood, and (c) the local 
grocery store. For each of these questions, I assign a score of 3 if women do not have to 
seek permission and can go alone, 2 if women do not have to seek permission but 
cannot go alone, 1 if women have to seek permission but can go alone, and 0 if women 
have to seek permission and cannot go alone. The other binary variable included in 
creating this score is whether women have cash-in-hand for household expenditures. 
Women’s autonomy score ranges from 0 to 2.8.  
Empirical Strategy 
Three specifications were used to estimate the effect of women’s bargaining 
power on household adoption of EH behaviors: pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression, household fixed effects (FE) and cluster FE11. Women’s socio-demographics 
                                                          
11Linear probability models were used for binary outcomes.  
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(age, education, has at least one child, hours worked/year) were included in the models 
to explain their bargaining power. Intra-household externality could inhibit women 
from adopting behaviors that benefit them and the entire household. Though they 
prefer health-improving EH behaviors, owing to their liquidity constraints they are 
unable to act on their preferences, when products are not offered free (Miller and 
Mobarak 2011). Similar to Miller and Mobarak (2011), I create power differential 
variables for age and education gap between women and the household head. 
Following Kishore and Spears’ (2014) finding that urban Indian women with a first born 
male child have higher status in the household, my models include gender of women’s 
first born child. Women’s relationship to the household head, and gender of household 
head are also important determinants of their bargaining power. Consistent with the 
empirical literature, characteristics of the household controlled for include total number 
of members, dependency ratio12, log of per capita total monthly expenditure, and hours 
of electricity access.  
My first estimation uses a pooled OLS model to examine the association between 
women’s bargaining power and household EH behaviors as follows:  
(1) 𝑌𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛
′𝑠 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡 
                                                          
12Dependency ratio was calculated by adding the number of children (15 years and under) and the older 
population (aged 65+), and dividing that sum by the working-age population (aged 15-64 years). 
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Where Yjt denotes EH behavior in household ‘j’ in time ‘t’; Women’s bargaining 
power indicators=name on bank account, name on house ownership/rental 
agreement and autonomy score (three separate indicators in the same specification); 
𝜃𝑡=1 if IHDS-II, 0 otherwise; αjt represents household-level characteristics (time-
varying and time-invariant), εjt=error term.  
The measures of women’s bargaining power may be subject to omitted variable 
bias owing to measurement error and/or due to unobserved women- and household-
specific factors such as their adaptive preferences and ability to convince their husbands 
or senior family members. Women with higher persuasion-ability are more likely to 
have higher bargaining power, and subsequently more likely is the household to adopt 
EH behaviors. While FE models do not address the measurement error problem, they 
can be used to control for time-invariant characteristics that bias estimates. Since 
household factors affect women-specific characteristics, next, I use the household FE 
model to estimate the effect of women’s bargaining power on household choice of EH 
behavior:  
(2) 𝑌𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛
′𝑠 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛺𝑗𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡 
Where 𝛿𝑗 is the household fixed effects and Ωjt represents household-level time-
varying characteristics.  
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Community-level factors can also determine household dynamics (Agarwal 
1997) and as women’s bargaining power is largely influenced by social norms and 
practices, women’s empowerment should be analyzed using an institutional approach 
rather than an individual one only (Mabsout and Van Staveren 2010). Since the 
combined influence of unmeasured neighborhood-level omitted variables is correlated 
with the different women’s bargaining power measures used in this analysis, omitting 
them will lead to biased estimates. To correct for this bias, I also use cluster-level or 
primary sampling unit13 (PSU) FE estimation: 
(3) 𝑌𝑗𝑐𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛
′𝑠 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝜌𝑐 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛺𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝑗𝑐𝑡 
Where Yjct is an EH behavior in household ‘j’, cluster ‘c’ in time ‘t’; 𝜌𝑐 is cluster fixed 
effects, Ωjct represents household-level time-varying characteristics in cluster ‘c’, and 
εjct is the error term.  
In all the three models, standard errors are clustered by PSU to reflect the IHDS 
three-stage survey design. 
                                                          
13In the IHDS data, primary sampling unit (PSU) is defined as village in the rural sample and 
neighborhood in the urban sample. In the rural sample (using the IHDS-II rural/urban classification, 
wherein some PSUs that were classified as rural in IHDS-I are classified urban in IHDS-II), in IHDS-I 
there were 1,483 PSUs and in IHDS-II, 1,469 PSUs. In the urban sample (also using the IHDS-II 






Environmental health behaviors and household characteristics 
Similar to the 2011 Census Survey of India that reported 68% rural households 
(i.e. 16.8 million rural households out of a total of 24.7 million households), nearly 65% 
of the analytic sample is located in rural areas. An increase14 in non-biomass stove users 
is observed in 2011-2012, with rural non-biomass stove users nearly doubling from 9% 
to 17% (Table 2.2). Compared to non-biomass stove users, a lower percentage of urban 
households use LPG for cooking. Use of clean cooking i.e. combination of non-biomass 
stove and LPG cooking fuel increased among rural (5% to 14%) and urban sampled 
households (37% to 54%). Toilet ownership also increased in rural (by almost 1.5 times), 
and urban households (from 71% to 82%). Piped drinking water access increased only 
by 4% for rural households but decreased for urban households by less than 1%. 
Though there were increases in drinking water treatment, the percentages were low for 
both rural (9%) and urban households (19%) in 2011-2012. Handwashing with soap 
increased among rural women by 1.5 times and among urban women by 1.2 times. 
The percentage of rural women with names on bank account (Table 2.3) nearly 
tripled in 2011-2012 (from 13% to 39%), while it almost doubled for urban women (from 
26% to 48%). While women’s sole or joint house ownership or rental agreement 
                                                          
14Results in this paper report statistically significant changes only, unless stated otherwise.  
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remained below 22% across both survey rounds, there were increases over time for both 
rural and urban women. The mean autonomy score increased for rural women but 
decreased for their urban counterparts over time. At baseline, rural and urban women’s 
highest decision-making score was regarding cooking (2.1 and 2.2, respectively), 
followed by child sickness-related action (1.2 and 1.3, respectively), and number of 
children (Table 2.4B). For all three indicators of permission-seeking, women scored 
lower in 2011-2012 i.e. higher percentage of rural and urban women sought permission 
from a household member. Over 90% rural and urban women had money to spend on 
household expenditures in 2011-2012.  
There are observed changes in household size and dependency ratio (Table 
2.4A). While there was increase in daily hours of electricity access among rural 
households (from 10 to 12), there was a marginal but significant decrease in the same 
among urban households. Both rural and urban (not statistically significant) households 
reported increase in land ownership, while only urban households reported increase in 
at least one non-farm business between survey rounds. Adjusting for inflation, there 
were increases in households’ monthly per capita consumption (614 INR15 for rural 
households and 2,829 INR for urban households). Female-headed households almost 
doubled in 2011-2012, and there is an increase in the education level of the household 
                                                          
151 USD=64.33 INR (as of February 5, 2018) 
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head. Rural eligible women, on average, at baseline were 33 years, had completed 3 
years of education and had 3 children (Table 2.4B). Urban eligible women at baseline, 
were similar to their rural counterparts in age (34 years), but had fewer children (2) and 
higher years of education (6 years).  
Factors associated with bargaining power of women 
Prior to examining the effects of women’s bargaining power on household 
adoption of EH behaviors, I first examine the determinants of women’s household-level 
bargaining. There are differences in measures of women’s bargaining power for both 
rural and urban households16. Women co-owning bank accounts and house or rental 
agreements are older, work longer hours per year, belong to female-headed households, 
and are in households with lower dependency ratio. These results are stronger for rural 
women. Women with higher autonomy score are younger (only urban sample), less 
educated (rural sample only), and have lesser age gap with the household head, have at 
least one child, and work longer hours per year. Compared to the daughter-in-law, wife 
of the household head has higher perceived autonomy. I also find that higher autonomy 
score women belong to female-headed households, households with fewer members, 
higher dependency ratio (only rural households), lower per capita monthly 
consumption (only rural sample) and longer hours of electricity (Table 2.5).  
                                                          
16Only household FE results are presented here, to be consistent with intra-household bargaining theory. 
Results from pooled OLS and cluster FE regressions are not substantively different.  
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Adoption of EH behaviors: Results from fixed effects models 
In the naïve regression models (Table 2.6), there is a positive relationship 
between household adoption of all EH behaviors and women’s co-ownership of bank 
account. Likewise, for the correlation between most EH behaviors (except drinking 
water treatment in both samples, and piped drinking water in the urban sample) and 
women’s co-ownership of house or rental agreement. In the urban sample, while 
households with high autonomy score among women, are more likely to have piped 
drinking water, there is an opposite relationship with clean cooking, toilets and 
handwashing with soap.  
On controlling for time-invariant household characteristics, in the household FE 
models (Table 2.7)17, I find that rural women’s sole or joint bank account ownership 
linearly increases the likelihood of household adoption of clean cooking by 2.6 
percentage points, toilets by 2.7 percentage points, and drinking water treatment by 2.2 
percentage points18. Similar to the coefficient on bank account co-ownership, women’s 
co-ownership of a house or rental agreement is linearly associated with a 2.7 
percentage-point increase in rural households’ clean cooking take-up, but unlike co-
                                                          
17Note that each column in the table refers to a different regression. Controls used in the household FE 
and cluster FE models are all the covariates included in the models in Table 2.5. 
18Results from the pooled OLS models are in Appendix A-1. In addition to all the covariates included in 
Table 2.5, the pooled OLS models also include a dummy for region (North, Central, North-East, East, 
West and South). Fixed effects model is preferred to the pooled OLS and random effects models 
following results from the Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests.  
 
32 
owning bank accounts, having a woman co-own a house/rental agreement, increases 
handwashing with soap by 4 percentage points. There is no effect of either women’s 
bank or house co-ownership on any of the five EH behaviors in the urban sample. 
Contrary to hypothesis, women’s autonomy score has a strong negative effect on clean 
cooking and drinking water treatment in the rural sample, and weak negative effect on 
toilet adoption in the urban sample. In other words, an increase in women’s autonomy 
score by 1-unit linearly decreases households’ likelihood of clean cooking take-up by 2.1 
percentage points, and drinking water treatment by 1.6 percentage points among rural 
households, and linearly decreases likelihood of toilet uptake in urban households by 
2.6 percentage points.  
Turning to the cluster FE models (Table 2.8), I find that rural women’s sole or 
joint bank account ownership linearly increases likelihood of household clean cooking 
adoption by 2.7 percentage points, which is similar to estimates from the household FE 
model; latrine adoption by 1.8 percentage points and drinking water treatment by 1.4 
percentage points, which are lower estimates but higher statistical significance 
(especially for clean cooking and drinking water treatment) than those in the household 
FE model. For urban households, having a woman sole or joint bank account owner 
linearly increases likelihood of household adoption of drinking water treatment by 3.5 
percentage points. Women’s co-ownership of a house or rental agreement has strong 
positive effects on all EH behaviors, except toilet take-up and drinking water treatment 
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in the rural sample, and only toilet take-up in the urban sample. Similar to the 
household FE model, women’s autonomy score has a strong negative effect on rural 
households’ adoption of clean cooking and drinking water treatment, and urban 
households’ toilet take-up.  
In exploring the relationship between bargaining power of women and 
household choice of EH behaviors, though I find more statistically significant coefficient 
estimates on my main explanatory variables in the cluster FE model, I prefer the 
household FE model despite its inefficiency and lower precision for the following 
reasons. First, the similar magnitude of coefficient estimates across models emphasizes 
the robustness of results. I would prefer using the household FE model as the 
comparison group for the household is itself in a different time period, which is the best 
counterfactual provided all other time-varying factors are controlled for. Second, choice 
of household FE model is supported in intra-household decision-making theory, but the 
same cannot be argued for cluster-level FE. In subsequent heterogeneity analysis and 
falsification tests, I use the household FE models only. 
Adoption of EH behaviors: Results by caste and region 
In the Indian social stratification system, there have historically been differences 
among caste groups. There is also variation across geographic regions within the 
country owing to cultural differences and varying levels of socio-economic 
development. In the study sample, over the 7 year time period, there are differences in 
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outcomes and measures of women’s bargaining power, across caste groups and 
government-assigned regional zones19. The pooled OLS models also show differences in 
results by caste category and region. To explore this further, I conduct disaggregated 
analysis by caste category and regions using the household FE model (equation 2). 
Caste  
Except for Other Backward Classes (OBCs), there are no significant effects of 
women’s bargaining power on household EH adoption in other caste categories (Table 
A-2). I find a strong positive effect of women’s bank account co-ownership on OBCs’ 
household adoption of drinking water treatment. Women’s co-ownership of house or 
rental agreement also has a strong positive effect on household take-up of handwashing 
with soap, but weak positive effect on clean cooking, among OBCs.  
Region    
There is regional variation in effects of women’s bargaining power on household 
EH adoption (Table A-3). In the North, I find a strong positive effect of women’s bank 
account co-ownership on household adoption of toilets and handwashing with soap. 
Consistent with the results for all rural households, I find a weak negative effect of 
autonomy score on clean cooking and drinking water treatment, among the Northern 
states. In the North-East, I find strong positive effects of women’s bank-account and 
                                                          
19See Table 2.1 for regional categories.  
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house co-ownership on clean drinking water-related outcomes (drinking water 
treatment and piped drinking water, respectively). In the Eastern states, the only 
significant positive effect (though weak) is that of women’s autonomy score on 
household take-up of handwashing with soap. There are strong results for many 
outcomes in the Western region. There is a strong positive effect of women’s bank 
account co-ownership on household adoption of drinking water treatment, but stronger 
positive effects of women’s house ownership on household choice of clean cooking, 
toilets, drinking water treatment and handwashing with soap. Women’s autonomy 
score has a strong negative effect on household choice of toilet, but a strong positive 
effect on women’s handwashing with soap.  
Falsification tests: Placebo assets 
To test whether the relationship between women’s bargaining power and EH 
behaviors is unique and is not due to omitted heterogeneity in household preferences or 
status which are unaccounted for, I estimate the relationship between women’s 
bargaining power and household goods preferred by men. Using the household FE 
model and restricting the sample to households with agricultural land, I use five 
alternate dependent variables: tube well, electric pump, tractor, diesel pump, and 
bullock cart. Except for weak positive effects of women’s bank account co-ownership on 
rural households’ choice of tube well and electric pump, I find no significant effect of 
women’s bargaining power measures on other agricultural equipment (Table 2.9). 
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These null results for placebo assets preferred by men rule out an alternate mechanism: 
that households invest in all types of assets as a result of women’s increased bargaining 
power.  
Discussion 
The locational heterogeneity in women’s bargaining power and EH behaviors 
presented in my analysis highlights important institutional constraints to be considered 
in explaining behavioral responses to environmental health programs. This paper 
contributes to the sparse literature on this topic as follows. First, I include both specific 
and perceived measures of women’s bargaining power to center attention on the 
differences in EH outcomes based on choice of power measures. Second, in using 
nationally-representative data from rural and urban settings that are generalizable, I 
demonstrate geographic variation in adoption of multiple EH behaviors. Then I use 
household and cluster FE models, separately, to test difference in size and significance 
of estimates depending on estimation strategy. Prior studies consider women’s 
bargaining relative to their spouses only, and in some analyses in relation to other 
household members. However, besides individual beliefs and preferences, women’s 
bargaining power in the household is also determined and shaped by societal changes 
external to the household. Fourth, I show that effects vary by caste and region.  
 In my analysis of the range of household and individual characteristics that 
determine each of the three indicators of women’s bargaining power, I find women’s 
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bargaining power to be positively correlated with age, having at least one child, hours 
of work, and female-headed household, and negatively correlated with dependency 
ratio. Women’s autonomy score has other determinants as well: lesser age gap between 
women and household head, relationship to household head (higher if wife or other 
household member, compared to daughter-in-law), smaller household size, lower 
monthly per capita expenditure and longer hours of daily electricity. These findings are 
similar to previous studies that consider these variables.  
  Focusing on the household FE model to explain differences in results between 
EH technologies and WaSH behaviors, I find rural women’s bank account co-ownership 
to have strong positive effects on household choice of clean cooking, toilets and 
drinking water treatment, but no significant effect on private piped water or 
handwashing with soap. A plausible reason for insignificant results for private piped 
drinking water could be its reliance not just on household desirability for improvements 
in environmental quality and purchase, but also on infrastructural support from local 
governments and community management of water resources, unlike clean cooking 
options and toilets. Drinking water treatment, however, is a household-level 
intervention that could be more effective in preventing health-debilitating diseases 
(Clasen et al 2007), and since water treatment options are fairly low-cost, rural women 
with bank accounts could be making these decisions. Separate analyses by region also 
show variation. I find strong positive effects of female bank account co-ownership on 
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take-up of toilets in the North and North-East, drinking water treatment in the North-
Eastern and Western regions and handwashing with soap only in the North.  
House co-ownership has strong positive effects only on clean cooking and 
handwashing with soap take-up in the rural sample. However, it has strong positive 
regional effects on adoption of toilets (West), piped drinking water (North-East) and 
drinking water treatment (West). On this bargaining power measure, strong positive 
effects are also observed in the Western states for clean cooking adoption and 
handwashing with soap. It is likely that in the North-East (i.e. Assam), housing 
infrastructure includes piped water inside the dwelling, or that having a rental 
agreement allows tenants to either request housing improvements from owners or 
make changes themselves. Though one would expect to see a positive effect of 
house/rental paper co-ownership on drinking water treatment as well, one of the 
reasons for not seeing this result in the current analysis could be either due to 
households viewing the two behaviors as substitutes, or that households are treating 
their drinking water at longer intervals (i.e. fortnightly or monthly basis) than is asked 
in the survey.  
There is a negative effect of women’s autonomy score on three EH behaviors, 
across rural and urban samples. These counter-intuitive results could either be owing to 
women’s low preferences for EH behaviors, although studies show women’s high 
preferences for clean cooking (Miller and Mobarak 2013; Hassen et al 2015) and toilets 
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(Stopnitzky 2017); or that the variable incorrectly measures women’s bargaining power. 
As this indicator mirrors women’s perceived and stated autonomy, it may not truly 
suggest their control over resources to exercise their autonomy. In running alternate 
analyses of the effect of autonomy score without the permission variables (since their 
scores decrease over time, and could be driving the decrease in autonomy score for the 
urban sample), I find the same negative results. Regional analyses, however, 
demonstrate weak positive effects of women’s perceived autonomy on handwashing 
with soap (East and West regions), and negative effects on clean cooking (North) and 
toilet adoption (West). However, including all three measures of women’s bargaining 
power in each estimation helps explain whether and which subjective and objective 
indicators affect EH behaviors. Future analysis could consider assigning different 
weights to the decision-making variables and include other questions relating to gender 
relations. In surveys with detailed questions on women’s empowerment across 
agricultural domains of production, resources, income, leadership and time, an index 
similar to the women’s empowerment in agriculture index could be created (Alkire et al 
2013). The creation of a similar index in non-agricultural contexts could be a useful tool 
to track progress towards gender equality and measure its impact on household well-
being.  
While it is puzzling that these results do not hold for the urban sample, it is 
likely that the low changes in outcomes and key explanatory variables for urban 
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households, relative to those in rural areas, could be a possible reason for not seeing 
significant results.  
 In terms of limitations, I note first that my results come from a non-experimental 
setting that does not involve a specific or bundle of development interventions targeted 
to increase women’s bargaining power. Second, though FE estimations have been used 
to address the omitted variable bias and control for unmeasured characteristics that 
could affect the endogenous bargaining power measures, they do not control for 
measurement errors of these key explanatory variables. Third, my analysis neither 
covers all potentially measurable variables of women’s bargaining power, nor includes 
the diversity of outputs in EH interventions (e.g. improved energy studies: types and 
number of clean stoves and fuels used, stove stacking, objective stove use; water 
interventions: water quantity and quality; and sanitation programs: objective measures 
of toilet use). Future experimental designs in single or multiple EH intervention studies 
should collect data on women’s objective control over resources, and consider including 
household-level bargaining games among all household members.  
Conclusion  
The scale of the environmental health burden and the critical role of women in 
development, necessitates understanding female empowerment to address the global 
household air pollution problem (Austin and Mejia 2017; Burke and Dundas 2015), and 
increase adoption and consistent use of WaSH interventions. Policy on sustainable 
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development should not only seek to bridge gender disparities but also work towards 
changing the broader social landscape within which these gender inequalities are 
perpetuated. At the global level, results from this paper are timely, given the SDGs’ 
emphasis on women’s role in safe water and sanitation and clean energy access. These 
results also coincide with the current policy landscape in India with recently introduced 
programs to ensure financial access to all and increase LPG market penetration, 
reinvigorated prior sanitation policies to encompass a gamut of cleanliness initiatives, 
and a scheme aimed at preventing female infanticide and educating the girl child. 
Evidence suggests reduction in leakages in government-run welfare programs 
(National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme-NREGS and Social Security Pension 
Program) in Andhra Pradesh India, from introduction of smart card intervention 
(Muralidharan et al 2016), reduction in women’s time spent collecting payment from 
transfer via mobile money versus cash in Niger (Aker et al 2016) and increase in 
women’s work from deposit of NREGS payments into female-owned bank accounts, 
relative to male-owned bank accounts, in Madhya Pradesh, India (Field et al 2016). 
Results from this paper show positive effects of women co-owned bank accounts on 
adoption of clean cooking, toilets and drinking water treatment among rural 
households-the population with least provision of these services. However, future 
research must examine whether and how government programs on women’s financial 
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inclusion not only reduce leakages in subsidy provision (e.g. LPG) but also translate 






Table 2.1. Analytic sample distribution per survey round 
  Rural Urban Total 
# Primary sampling units 
(PSU) 
1,422 937 2,359 
# PSU by region       
North 300 204 504 
Central 327 145 472 
North-East 29 19 48 
East 231 172 403 
West 189 138 327 
South 346 259 605 
# Households 17,280 7,666 24,946 
NOTE: Region categories are based on the national 
government’s classification of zones. Each region comprises the 
following States & Union Territories: North (Delhi, Haryana, 
Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan); 
Central (Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Uttar 
Pradesh); North-East (Assam); East (Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, 
West Bengal); West (Goa, Gujarat, Maharashtra) and South 
(Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu). The 
following States or Union Territories are excluded from this 
analysis, owing to this paper’s inclusion criteria: Chandigarh 
(North); Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, 
Nagaland, Tripura (North-East); Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Daman 




Table 2.2. Outcome variables: IHDS-I (2004-2005) and II (2011-2012) 
  Rural (N=34,560) Urban (N=15,332) 
  IHDS-I IHDS-II IHDS-I IHDS-II 
Environmental health technologies (%)Ɨ     
Non-biomass stove  8.8 17.4 57.8 73.3 
LPG mainly used as cooking fuel 18.1 28.4 49.3 62.0 
Clean cooking energy (use of LPG fuel 
& non-biomass stove) 
4.9 13.9 36.6 54.2 
Toilet ownership   26.8 41.9 71.2 82.4 
Piped drinking water 30.7 35.1 69.8 69.1 
WaSH behaviors (%)Ɨ     
Weekly drinking water treatment 4.6 8.8 14.1 19.4 
Women practice handwashing with soap 
after defecating 
38.8 59.4 72.3 84.5 
 Rural (N=22,242) Urban (N=1,592) 
 IHDS-I IHDS-II IHDS-I IHDS-II 
Agricultural equipment (%)     
Tube wellƗƗ 19.0 20.2 7.5 15.8 
Electric pumpƗƗ 17.0 18.1 11.1 13.0 
TractorƗ 5.2 6.5 1.5 3.7 
Diesel pumpƗƗ 10.7 9.9 5.5 4.9 
Bullock cartƗ 15.5 13.0 6.2 4.0 
NOTE:  Ɨ Variables are significantly different across survey rounds (1% significance level).  





Table 2.3. Women’s bargaining power variables: IHDS-I (2004-2005) and II (2011-
2012)  
  Rural (N=34,560) Urban (N=15,332) 
  IHDS-I IHDS-II IHDS-I IHDS-II 
Specific control over resources          
Name on any bank account-joint/sole (%) 12.6 38.9 26.2 48.4 
Name on house ownership or rental 
papers- joint/sole (%) 
14.3 17.2 16.1 20.7 










NOTE: Ɨ All variables are significantly different across survey rounds (1% significance level). 
Standard deviation in parentheses for continuous variables.  
 
 
Table 2.4. Summary statistics: IHDS-I (2004-2005) and II (2011-2012) Ɨ     
  Rural (N=34,560) Urban (N=15,332) 
A. Household characteristics    
 IHDS-I IHDS-II IHDS-I IHDS-II 
Household size 5.8 (2.6) 5.3 (2.4) 5.3 (2.2) 5.1 (2.2) 
Dependency ratio 0.8 (0.7) 0.6 (0.7) 0.7 (0.6) 0.5 (0.6) 
Caste category (%)     
General 26.8  40.4  
Other backward class 40.9  39  
Scheduled caste 23  17.9  
Scheduled tribe 9.2  2.8  
Hours of electricity access per day 9.9 (8.7) 11.5 (8.0) 17.3 (7.4) 17.1 (6.8) 
Household has any owned or cultivated land (%) 63 65.7 10.1 10.6 
Household has at least one non-farm business (%) 17.3 17.2 31.6 33.7 

















Years of education of household head 4.4 (4.4) 5.1 (4.6) 7.4 (4.9) 7.9 (4.9) 
Female household head (%) 7.5 14.4 8.3 14.1 
B. Woman characteristics       
Age (in years) 32.9 (8.0) 39.9 (8.0) 33.9 (7.7) 40.8 (7.7) 









Years of education 3.2 (4.1) 3.3 (4.1) 6.4 (5.0) 6.6 (5.0) 
Educational difference between eligible woman and 
household head (in years) 
1.2 (4.5) 1.8 (4.5) 1.0 (4.6) 1.3 (4.4) 
Age of marriage (in years) 16.9 (3.3) 17.0 (3.3) 18.4 (3.6) 18.5 (3.6) 
Marital status (%)     
Married 96.4 92.5 95.7 91.2 
Widowed 3.1 6.8 3.4 7.8 
Separated 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 






Total number of children 2.8 (1.6) 3.1 (1.5) 2.5 (1.5) 2.7 (1.4) 
First born is a boy (%) 48.3 43.9 48.6 48.6 









Household member has bank account (%) 30.2 68.5 50.8 75.6 
Decision-making score for:      
Cooking 2.1 (1.0) 2.1 (0.9) 2.2 (0.9) 2.1 (0.9) 
Purchase of expensive item (e.g. television or fridge) 0.8 (0.7) 0.9 (0.7) 0.9 (0.7) 1.0 (0.7) 
Number of children  1.0 (0.7) 1.2 (0.7) 1.1 (0.8) 1.2 (0.7) 
Child sickness-related action 1.2 (0.9) 1.3 (0.8) 1.3 (0.9) 1.3 (0.8) 
Children's spouse 0.6 (0.7) 0.9 (0.8) 0.7 (0.8) 0.9 (0.8) 
Permission-seeking score:      
Health center 1.1 (1.0) 0.9 (0.7) 1.5 (1.1) 1.0 (0.8) 
Home of relatives or friends 1.1 (1.0) 1.1 (0.9) 1.3 (1.1) 1.1 (0.8) 
Local grocery store 1.3 (1.2) 1.3 (1.0) 1.6 (1.2) 1.2 (1.0) 
Cash-in-hand to spend on household expenditures (%) 79.7 92.2 86.9 95.2 
NOTE: Ɨ All variables are significantly different across survey rounds (1% significance level), except results 








Table 2.5. Determinants of women's bargaining power by location: Household FE models 


















Individual characteristics       
Age (in years) 0.011*** 0.003* -0.002 0.012*** 0.004** -0.020*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Number of years of 
education completed 
0.004 0.000 -0.007* 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Age gap between woman 
and household head (in 
years) 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Education gap between 
woman and household head 
(in years) 
0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Has at least one child -0.017 0.023 0.221*** 0.021 0.029 0.315*** 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.027) (0.044) (0.034) (0.045) 
First born child is a boy 0.015 0.018 0.004 -0.007 -0.036 -0.020 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.025) (0.024) (0.029) 
Number of hours 
worked/year 
0.000*** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Relationship to household 
head 
      
Wife -0.020 -0.023 0.123*** 0.004 0.008 0.131** 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.026) (0.042) (0.038) (0.053) 
Other family member 0.035 0.002 0.329*** 0.038 0.101** 0.313*** 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.035) (0.054) (0.049) (0.071) 






Household size -0.004 0.000 -0.023*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Dependency ratio -0.002 -0.011* 0.035*** -0.009 0.013 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) 
Log of per capita total 
monthly 
expenditure/consumption 
adjusted for inflation (in 
INR) 
0.013 -0.002 -0.020* 0.020 0.027* -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) 
Hours of electricity 
access/day 
-0.001 -0.001 0.005*** -0.002* -0.001 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Female-headed household 0.041* 0.058** 0.234*** 0.044 0.010 0.276*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.038) (0.037) (0.044) 
Family member has bank 
account 
0.463***   0.488***   
 (0.012)   (0.018)   
Constant -0.407*** 0.038 1.100*** -0.514*** -0.164 1.536*** 
 (0.073) (0.084) (0.104) (0.140) (0.134) (0.171) 
Observations 34,560 34,560 34,560 15,332 15,332 15,332 
Adjusted R-squared 0.709 0.546 0.658 0.712 0.562 0.647 
NOTE:  Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ‘Daughter-in-law’ is the base category for 









Table 2.6. Women's bargaining power and household EH behavior adoption (Naïve 
regression estimates): Summary of coefficients 
  Rural (N=34,560) 













0.094*** 0.178*** 0.019* 0.042*** 0.167*** 




0.036*** 0.028** 0.079*** 0.001 0.050*** 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.012) 
Autonomy score 
0.003 0.012 0.065*** 0.014*** -0.01 
(0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.024 0.029 0.010 0.006 0.024 
  Urban (N=15,332) 













0.199*** 0.162*** 0.038*** 0.125*** 0.157*** 




0.039*** 0.053*** 0.004 0.009 0.028** 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.01) (0.011) 
Autonomy score 
-0.026** -0.062*** 0.055*** 0.008 -0.044*** 
(0.011) (0.01) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.041 0.043 0.005 0.028 0.038 





Table 2.7. Women's bargaining power and household EH behavior adoption 
(Household FE estimates): Summary of coefficients 
  Rural (N=34,560) 













0.026** 0.027** 0.010 0.022** 0.003 




0.027*** -0.007 0.012 -0.002 0.040** 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.018) 
Autonomy score 
-0.021** -0.000 -0.016 -0.016** -0.003 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.015) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.638 0.766 0.766 0.604 0.675 
  Urban (N=15,332) 













-0.017 -0.008 -0.006 0.028 0.001 




-0.010 0.021 0.013 0.010 -0.004 
(0.024) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Autonomy score 
0.013 -0.026* 0.010 0.018 0.014 
(0.020) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.636 0.747 0.745 0.606 0.657 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Household-
level (household size, dependency ratio, log of per capita monthly expenditure, hours of daily 
electricity access, female-headed household, family member has bank account) and 
individual-level (age, years of completed education, age gap between woman and household 
head, education gap between woman and household head, has at least one child, first born is 
a boy, number of hours worked in the past year, relationship to household head) factors have 





Table 2.8. Women's bargaining power and household EH behavior adoption (Cluster 
FE estimates): Summary of coefficients 
  Rural (N=34,560) 













0.027*** 0.018** 0.002 0.014*** -0.001 




0.024*** 0.011 0.013* -0.001 0.039*** 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) 
Autonomy score 
-0.013*** -0.011* -0.011* -0.009** -0.005 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.287 0.483 0.578 0.301 0.423 
  Urban (N=15,332) 













-0.013 -0.001 0.000 0.035*** -0.008 




0.011 0.023*** 0.005 0.012 0.013 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Autonomy score 
-0.002 -0.029*** 0.013* 0.008 0.006 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.369 0.452 0.522 0.322 0.404 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Household-
level (household size, dependency ratio, log of per capita monthly expenditure, hours of daily 
electricity access, female-headed household, family member has bank account) and individual-
level (age, years of completed education, age gap between woman and household head, 
education gap between woman and household head, has at least one child, first born is a boy, 
number of hours worked in the past year, relationship to household head) factors have been 
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CHAPTER 3:  SOCIAL CAPITAL AND CHOICE OF CLEAN COOKING AND SAFE 
SANITATION IN INDIA 
Introduction 
Household air pollution (HAP), from burning solid fuels in inefficient 
cookstoves, and poor water and sanitation are the leading environmental risk factors for 
disease burden (6th and 7th highest, respectively) in developing countries (Fourouzanfar 
et al 2015). India, home to over 1.34 billion people, with 10 of its 29 states and union 
territories exceeding a population of 60 million (equivalent to large countries), has four 
of its highest disease burden risk factors linked to HAP and inadequate water and 
sanitation (Dandona et al 2017; GBD 2017). These leading causes, in order, are ischemic 
heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, diarrheal diseases and lower 
respiratory infections20.  
Although clean household energy alternatives, such as improved cookstoves 
(ICS), liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and electricity are possible solutions to the HAP 
problem, their uptake has been dismally low (Lewis and Pattanayak 2012; Puzzolo et al 
                                                          
20Among these risk factors, HAP-related illnesses include ischemic heart disease (WHO 2018), chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (Kurmi et al 2010; Smith et al 2004; van Gemert et al 2015), lower 
respiratory infections (Gurley et al 2014; Smith et al 2000; van Gemert et al 2015), and stroke (WHO 2018). 
Poor water and sanitation conditions lead to diarrhea (Fewtrell et al 2005; Prüss et al 2002) and lower 
respiratory infections (Rabie and Curtis 2006; Walker et al 2013).  
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2013; Rehfuess et al 2014). In the absence of behavior change programs, interventions to 
increase access to safe water and sanitation have also met with limited success (Mosler 
2012). Various components of the complex concept of social capital have been examined 
in the development literature. Community cohesion, for example, is a collective asset 
that can have positive externalities (Kawachi et al 2008), and there is empirical evidence 
from the developing world of the positive impact of social networks on microfinance 
participation (Banerjee et al 2013), adoption of fertilizer (Isham 2002), agricultural 
weather insurance (Cai, de Janvry and Sadoulet 2014) and healthcare utilization (Oster 
and Thornton 2012; Story 2014). Social learning is a crucial channel through which 
people could adopt environmental health (EH) technologies in the long-run after short-
run subsidies (Dupas, 2014). However, the role of social capital, including social 
relations, norms and formal institutions, in clean energy adoption is understudied 
(Lewis and Pattanayak 2012; Pachauri and Rao 2012; Rehfuess et al 2014). Examining the 
role of community social capital in the broader context of EH technologies will provide 
an important perspective into existing societal factors that enable or inhibit their 
adoption. 
Using a nationally representative panel dataset of Indian households, this paper 
examines whether community-level structural and cognitive social capital explain 
household adoption of EH technologies, including LPG for cooking, individual 
household latrines or toilets, and piped drinking water. Across rural and urban areas, I 
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find linking ties and social cohesion to significantly positively influence household 
adoption of LPG and toilets, respectively. The significant effect of bridging groups on 
clean cooking energy, particularly in rural settings, depends on their nature (positive 
for female-centric groups and negative for activity-based organizations). Bonding 
groups have strong positive effects on toilet adoption. There also exist complementary 
effects of EH interventions, with effects being stronger between clean energy and toilet 
uptake.  
While the Indian government’s policy push towards LPG provision is recent 
(Government of India 2018), programs since the mid-1980s (National Program on 
Improved Chulhas in 1985, National Biomass Cookstove Initiative in 2009) have 
attempted to extend use of ‘clean energy’ (Venkataraman et al 2010). Since the late 
1980s, clean sanitation programs in various forms have been implemented but with 
limited success: Central Rural Sanitation Program in 1986, ‘demand-driven’ and 
‘community-led’ Total Sanitation Campaign in 2001, Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan in rural 
India and Basic Services for Urban Poor in 2007, and Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India 
Mission) in 2014 (WSSCC 2016). Though there has been an increase in the percentage of 
households with latrines between 2001 (36.4%) and 2011 (46.9%) (Census of India 2011), 
India is still home to the highest number of open defecators, globally (WHO and 
UNICEF 2017). Among many revisions to its predecessor program, the Swachh Bharat 
Abhiyan aims to focus on (a) behavior change towards toilet construction and use 
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among populations and communities, and (b) use of technology and media to 
communicate the advantages of safe sanitation and hygiene (Government of India 
2014). A better understanding of existing social resources, that can be leveraged, is 
central to realizing the intended benefits of these national programs for clean energy 
and safe sanitation.  
Literature Review 
Social capital was first defined by Bourdieu (1986) as “the aggregate of the actual 
or potential resources that are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintances and recognition, or in other 
words, to membership in a group”. He argued for individuals’ social capital as 
dependent on (1) the size of network connections that the individual ‘‘can effectively 
mobilize’’ and (2) the amount and type(s) of capital (e.g., economic, cultural, or 
symbolic) possessed by each of those to whom she or he is related. Coleman (1988) 
subsequently conceptualized social capital as not just a single unit, but as various 
entities with two shared characteristics: (a) consisting of some feature of social 
structure, and (b) enabling actions of individuals operating within that framework. In 
underscoring the public good aspect of social capital, he also argued for trustworthiness 
of the social environment, and norms and effective sanctions as being central to the 
concept. Putnam (1993) built on Bourdieu’s theory of social capital to theorize it as 
consisting of features such as networks, interpersonal trust, norms of reciprocity, and 
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social engagement that build community and social participation. The amount of social 
capital in a community (e.g., neighborhood, town/city, state, nation), a collective feature 
generated through norms of reciprocity and trust among residents, has implications for 
a host of beneficial outcomes for that community.  
 The broad concept of social capital is further divided into structural and 
cognitive. The former assesses interpersonal exchanges within a social network and the 
influence of its reciprocity (Heaney and Israel 2008), while the latter gauges 
institutional, often unwritten, rules that communities themselves form to change (“rule 
out”) or reinforce (“rule in”) repetitive behavior (Ostrom 2005). Structural social capital 
can be operationalized as bridging, bonding or linking. Bridging social capital describes 
ties between heterogeneous groups that cut across class, race, ethnicity; it allows for 
different groups to exchange information and develop consensus (Narayan and 
Pritchett 1999). Bonding social capital refers to ties within social groups whose members 
share the same social identity, similar ethnicity, shared values i.e. groups are 
homogenous (Putnam 2001). Lastly, linking social capital exists when there are “norms 
of respect and networks of trusting relationships between people who are interacting 
across explicit, formal or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society” 
(Szreter and Woolcook 2004).  
Studies have shown how households in developing countries provide informal 
insurance to each other (Ambrus et al 2014; De Weerdt and Dercon 2006; Fafchamps and 
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Lund 2003; Udry 1994). Financial networks such as loans and transfers aid in 
consumption smoothing, while kin networks support large financial investments 
(Kinnan and Townsend 2012). Banerjee et al (2013) argue for social networks as assisting 
in information flow (‘diffusion centrality’) versus the influence of neighbors’ 
participation decisions (‘endorsement effects’) in Indian microfinance groups. Increased 
meeting frequency among microfinance group members leads to lower loan defaults 
(Feigenberg et al 2011), and receiving business counseling and financial training with a 
friend increases women’s business activity (Field et al 2014).  
Social networks positively affect adoption of contraceptives (Behrman, Kohler 
and Watkins 2002), family planning behavior (Paek et al 2008), HIV test results 
(Godlonton and Thornton 2012) and menstrual cups (Oster and Thornton 2012). Some 
studies find protective effects of bonding and bridging on self-rated health (Iwase et al 
2012; Kim et al 2006). Others find limited effects of social learning on children’s receipt 
of deworming drugs (Kremer and Miguel 2007) and associations between structural 
social capital (group membership and citizenship) and child nutritional status (De Silva 
and Harpham 2007). Development outcomes may have different associations with 
structural and cognitive social capital. For instance, utilization of antenatal care, 
professional delivery care and childhood immunizations have positive associations 
with bridging social capital; strong bonding ties negatively predict use of preventive 
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care but positively predict professional delivery care among ever-married women 
(Story 2014).  
Diffusion theory has helped explain how innovative technologies lead to societal 
changes and how societal constructs enable innovations and their transmission (Brown 
2001; Rogers 1995). In the agricultural technology adoption literature, there is evidence 
of farmers learning from each other but also free-riding (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; 
Munshi 2004). Number of adopters known to farmers increases their probability of 
adopting hybrid cocoa in Ghana (Boahene et al 1999), but there is an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between number of adopters among family and friends, and farmers’ 
probability of adopting sunflowers in Mozambique (Bandiera and Rasul 2006) and new 
agricultural technologies in Ethiopia (Liverpool-Tasie and Winter-Nelson 2012). Using 
data from Tanzania, Isham (2002) demonstrates that households with ethnically 
established and participatory social connections are more likely to diffuse newly 
acquired information, and consequently adopt fertilizers. Social learning (BenYishay 
and Mobarak 2015; Carter, Laajaj and Yang 2014; Conley and Udry 2010) and social 
capital (Katungi et al 2008) are central to information exchange in agricultural research 
and extension services, diffusion of agricultural technology and fertilizer adoption.  
In the EH literature, social learning through peer groups positively influences 
antimalarial treatment adoption in Tanzania (Adhvaryu 2014), latrine ownership in 
India (Shakya et al 2014; Shakya et al 2015) and ICS adoption in Mali (Bonan et al 2017). 
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Social learning through opinion leaders, however, leads households in Bangladesh to 
draw negative interpretations about ICS and social learning is more central for ICS with 
less noticeable benefits (Miller and Mobarak 2015). They argue that while marketing 
campaigns can initiate early ICS adoption, their sustained use depends on the 
technologies’ alignment with local preferences. Engagement with opinion leaders and 
active community members affects adoption of solar disinfection technology for 
drinking water in Bolivia (Moser and Mosler 2008) and solar home system in Sri Lanka 
(McEachern and Hanson 2008), favoring of ICS but not actual purchase in Uganda 
(Beltramo et al 2014) and information sharing about ICS in Honduras (Ramirez et al 
2014). More recently, Vulturius and Wanjiru (2017) use egocentric social network 
analysis and find that adoption of ICS in Kenya is higher when implementers targeted 
women’s self-help groups and teachers and ICS users interacted with other users. At the 
community level, evidence from Peru suggests that in villages with high bonding social 
capital, household-level adoption of ICS is significantly higher (Adrianzén 2014).  
According to the competing illnesses literature, among households that face 
multiple disease risks, with the decrease in one disease risk, the marginal utility of 
investing in a different prevention for reduction in another risk would increase i.e. there 
is complementarity of health inputs (Becker 2007; Dow et al 1997; Kaestner et al 2014). 
Despite the complementarities in EH risks (i.e. the linkages between lack of clean 
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energy and unsafe water and sanitation), there are no studies that examine whether 
adoption of one EH technology predicts adoption of other related technologies. 
Much of the evidence in the EH literature, especially clean energy adoption, has 
focused on social networks and peer relations on the initial uptake and sustained 
adoption, using qualitative (Rogers 2003; Bielecki and Wingenbach 2014) and 
quantitative methods (Beltramo et al 2015; Miller and Mobarak 2015). However, it is 
important to examine the complementary role of structural and cognitive social capital 
in development, as they measure different dimensions of the vast concept of social 
capital.  
In filling the gap in the EH technology adoption literature, the goal of this paper 
is to examine (a) the effect of community-level social capital (structural and cognitive)21 
on household adoption of EH technologies; (b) whether this relationship varies by 
geographic location; and (c) whether there are complementarities in EH technology 
uptake. Relying on survey questions in the dataset, measures of social capital included 
are social networks, bridging and bonding groups, political participation, social 
cohesion and collective action.  
                                                          
21The inclusion of community-level social capital, as the key explanatory variable, is in keeping with 
Putnam’s (1993) theoretical argument, and empirical studies from the health (Kim et al 2006; Shakya et al 




This paper uses 2004-2005 (Round 1) and 2011-2012 (Round 2) nationally 
representative household panel data from the India Human Development Survey 
(Desai and Vanneman 2005, 2011-12). Round 1 surveyed 41,554 households across 1,503 
villages and 971 urban neighborhoods, while Round 2 re-surveyed a vast majority of 
these households to survey a total of 42,152 households. Households were selected 
using a three-stage cluster sampling design in both rounds. The analytic sample in this 
paper comprises a balanced panel of 35,618 households in each survey round 
(N=71,236). Survey data in both rounds include EH indicators, detailed measures of 
social capital, household socioeconomics and consumption, demographics and 
information of household assets. Village surveys captured information on village 
structure, composition, employment, infrastructure, medical and educational facilities, 
land use, prices, and crop inputs and outputs.  
Measures 
The focus of this paper is on three dependent variables, namely, clean cooking 
(i.e. use of non-biomass stove and LPG cooking fuel), toilets and piped drinking water 
within house premises. Using two separate questions asked in the household survey on 
choice of cooking (type of stove, and type of cooking fuel), I create a dichotomous 
variable for clean cooking: households that use a non-biomass stove and LPG for 
cooking (coded ‘1’, otherwise ‘0’). On safe sanitation, based on households’ response to 
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the type of toilet they have access to, I create a binary variable for households using 
latrines (coded ‘1’ if using traditional pit latrine, semi-flush toilet or flush toilet; ‘0’ if 
defecating in the open), and a categorical variable for type of toilet household has access 
to. Households are assigned code ‘1’ if they have access to piped drinking water inside 
their dwelling, and ‘0’ otherwise.  
Social capital, the main explanatory variable of interest, is further divided into 
structural and cognitive social capital. Under structural social capital, indicators I 
include are:  
(1) Social networks - These linking ties are measured by households’ association 
with key influential people in their community. The specific questions asked in the 
surveys were: “Among your acquaintances and relatives, are there any who (a) are 
doctors/nurses or who work in hospitals and clinics, (b) are teachers, school officials or 
anybody who works in a school; (c) are in government service?” For each of these 
questions, responses are binary.  
(2) Group participation - This is measured by household’s membership in the 
following organizations: women’s groups, self-help groups, credit/savings groups, 
youth clubs, trade/business organizations, religious groups and caste groups.  
(3) Political participation - These indicators were measured by households’ 
response to two questions: “Have you or anyone in the household attended a public 
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meeting called by the village panchayat/nagarpalika/ward committee in the last year?” 
and “Is anyone in the household an official of the village panchayat/nagarpalika/ward 
committee?” Responses to both these questions are binary.  
Under cognitive social capital, I create indicators for:  
(1) Social cohesion: The two survey questions that measure this, ask households: 
“In this village/neighborhood, do people generally get along with each other or is there 
some conflict or a lot of conflict?”, and “In this village/neighborhood, how much 
conflict would you say there is among the communities/castes that live here?” For both 
questions, responses were coded ‘1’ for ‘lot of conflict, ‘2’ for ‘some conflict’ and ‘3’ for 
‘get along/no conflict’.  
(2) Collective action: Households were asked, “In some communities, when there 
is a water supply problem, people bond together to solve the problem. In other 
communities, people take care of their own families individually. What is your 
community like?” Responses were coded ‘1’ if household reported ‘bond together to 
solve problem’ and ‘0’ if they reported ‘each family solves individually’. 
Using exploratory factor analysis, a factor score was calculated for every social 
capital indicator for each household. Each factor was then aggregated at the community 
level (villages in rural areas and neighborhoods in urban areas). Principal component 
factor method was used, and the first six factors were rotated using the promax 
rotation, as the factors are likely to be correlated. The first six factors clearly fall under 
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the categories of social capital described in previous sections (Table B-1)22. Factor 1 
(linking score) includes households’ acquaintances in the health, education and 
government service sectors. Factor 2 (female-centric bridging score) includes 
households’ participation in groups that largely comprise women i.e. women’s group, 
self-help group and credit/savings group. Factor 3 (bonding score) comprises caste and 
religious group memberships. Social cohesion falls in Factor 4, with households’ views 
of overall community cohesion, and caste cohesion in the community. Factor 5 (activity-
based bridging score) comprises households’ membership in youth/reading group and 
trade union. Finally, Factor 6 reflects political participation, and includes any household 
member’s attendance at a public meeting, and household member elected/appointed as 
government representative/official.  
Empirical Strategy 
Inherent attributes of households and its members affect their “web of 
influence”, that in turn could affect household behavior. As there could be different 
pathways (e.g. educated household members have more information about disease 
risks, membership in community groups creates awareness about new products that 
improve human health and welfare) through which social capital influences household 
                                                          
22Owing to high (0.8865) unique variance (i.e. uniqueness) of the ‘collective action’ question and its lower 
relevance in the factor model, this variable has been included independently in the analyses. 
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choice of EH technologies, it is important to first understand the characteristics that 
differentiate high social capital households from those with low social capital.  
Using the household panel across two survey rounds, I first conduct household-
level fixed effects (FE)23 analysis to analyze the determinants of social capital.  
(1) 𝑌𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝛿𝑗 + 𝛺𝑗𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡 
Where Yjt denotes household-level social capital indicators (linking, bridging, 
bonding, political participation, social cohesion and collective action) in household 
‘j’ in time ‘t’; 𝜃𝑡=1 if Round 2, 0 if Round 1; 𝛿𝑗 is household fixed effects; Ωjt 
represents household-level time-varying characteristics; εjt=error term. Household 
characteristics included are, per capita log of monthly expenditure, household size, 
number of married women, highest male and female adult education, dependency 
ratio, demographics of the household head (age, sex), house ownership and hours of 
electricity available to the household. 
Next, using household-level FE models again, I analyze the effect of social capital 
on household choice of EH technology (Equation 2). Household-level FE control for 
factors specific to the household that do not vary over time but could bias social capital 
estimates in a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model.  
                                                          
23Fixed effects model is preferred to the pooled OLS and random effects models following results from 
the Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests.   
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(2) 𝑌𝑗𝑐𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝛿𝑗 + 𝛺𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝑗𝑐𝑡 
Where Yjct denotes EH technology (clean cooking, toilets and piped drinking water) 
in household ‘j’, in community ‘c’, in time ‘t’; Community-level social capital 
indicators’ scores=linking, bridging, bonding, political participation, social cohesion 
and collective action; Ωjct represents household-level time-varying characteristics24; 
εjct=error term. In these models, 𝛽1 is the coefficient of interest.  
In order to examine the complementary effects of engaging in EH behaviors, 
another set of models is estimated extending the above equation, where 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are 
the coefficients of interest: 
(3) 𝑌𝑗𝑐𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐸𝐻 𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝛿𝑗 + 𝛺𝑗𝑐𝑡
+ 𝑗𝑐𝑡 
Where EH behaviors in household ‘j’, in community ‘c’, in time ‘t’ include clean 
cooking, toilets, piped drinking water and safe treatment of drinking water25.  
As a robustness check, among rural households only where village surveys were 
administered, I replicate the household fixed effects models in Equations 2 and 3 and 
include village-level characteristics that could affect household choice of EH behaviors. 
                                                          
24These variables are the same as those included in Equation 1. 
 
25This is a binary variable, coded ‘1’ if households ‘always’ treated their drinking water, and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Drinking water treatment methods asked in the survey are: boiling, filtering with a purchased filter, 
using Aquaguard (branded advanced water purifier) or adding chemicals.  
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For example, lack of village infrastructure could impede households’ awareness of 
products and access to markets; thin markets for health-improving technologies could 
impose limitations on household purchase of EH products, even if households desired 
them. Prohibitive costs of EH technologies could be another impediment, as is 
consistently evidenced in the literature. Therefore, in addition to household 
characteristics controlled for in previous models, in a restricted sample of rural 
households with village-level data, I include years of cable television access in the 
village (as a proxy for media exposure), distance to nearest road (indicator for market 
access), distance to nearest bank branch/credit cooperative (proxy for access to credit 
facilities) and per unit price of LPG cylinder26.  
The following model (Equation 4) of household EH behavior is used: 
(4) 𝑌𝑗𝑐𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑉𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑐𝑡
+  𝜃𝑡 +  𝛿𝑗 + 𝛺𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝑗𝑐𝑡 
Where village characteristics in community ‘c’, in time ‘t’ include years of cable 
television access in the village, distance to nearest road (in kilometers), distance to 
nearest bank branch/credit cooperative (in kilometers) and per unit price of LPG 
cylinder (in INR).  
                                                          
26Per unit price of LPG cylinder is included in the clean energy outcome only. Price of toilet construction 
and piped drinking water tariffs were not asked in the survey. 
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Extending the equation above, complementarities of EH behaviors were also 
examined. In all analyses, household FE models are run as a linear probability models 
(LPM) and are conducted with the full sample of households. Analyses with locational 
(rural-urban) subsamples are conducted as well (except for Equation 4 that is conducted 
for the rural sample only). In all models, standard errors are clustered at the primary 
sampling unit (PSU) level, in consistency with the IHDS three-stage survey design.  
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Outcome variables: There are significant increases in EH technologies between 
Round 1 and Round 2 (Table 3.1). Clean cooking increased significantly to 28.7% from 
16.7%, with the increase being higher in rural areas (from 5% to 14.2%) than urban areas 
(from 39.3% to 56.7%). Toilet coverage doubled in rural areas (from 28.1% to 41.9%) and 
also significantly increased in the urban sample (74.5% to 83.1%). Piped drinking water 
access increased significantly in rural areas (from 30.4% to 34.7%) but reported 
significant decrease in urban areas (71.4% to 70.8%), as urban areas reported increase in 
use of tube wells and covered wells as drinking water sources. 
Explanatory variables (Structural social capital): On social network measures, there 
are significant increases in household acquaintances in the education sector, for both 
rural (from 38.4% to 57.2%) and urban (from 41.2% to 64%) households, and the medical 
domain (increase of 24% for rural and 28.5% for urban samples) (Table 3.2). Linking ties 
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with government officials decreased significantly for all samples, remaining below 40%. 
In factor analysis results, the networks factor for rural areas increased from -0.28 to 0.14, 
while that for urban areas increased from -0.10 to 0.38. 
Two types of bridging groups emerged from the factor analysis: finance and 
economic development groups that largely comprise women (Mahila Mandal or 
women’s groups, self-help groups i.e. SHGs and credit/savings groups), and those that 
are activity-based (youth/reading groups, and trade or business associations). There is 
higher increase in urban than rural households’ membership in women’s groups. 
Household membership in SHGs significantly increased, with higher increases reported 
in the rural (11.3% to 22.1%) versus urban households (6.1% to 14%). Membership of 
any household member in credit/savings groups also significantly increased but 
remained below 12%. The women-dominated bridging groups factor significantly 
increased for both groups, but the factor in Round 2 was higher for rural (0.20) than 
urban areas (0.02). Membership in youth/reading groups significantly decreased for 
both rural and urban areas, while membership in trader/business associations 
significantly increased. In Round 2, the activity-based bridging group factor was higher 
in urban (0.11) than rural households (-0.16).  
Consistent with the literature, caste and religious groups emerged as bonding 
groups in the factor analysis. Membership in both groups significantly decreased, 
 
79 
except for urban households’ membership in religious groups. The negative bonding 
factor was lower in rural   (-0.08) than urban areas (-0.05) in Round 2.  
Political participation factor comprises household member attendance in any 
public meeting in the past year, and household member or acquaintance represented in 
any local government body. On the former, there is significant increase in rural 
households’ participation (from 35.8% to 37.1%) but on the latter, there is significant 
decrease (12.7% to 5%). In urban households, there are significant decreases on both 
indicators (15% to 13%, and 5.6% to 1.8%, respectively). The political participation score 
decreases in both samples between Rounds (on average, from (0.10 to -0.10).  
Explanatory variables (Cognitive social capital): Households’ perceptions of village-
level conflict resolution and tension between communities form the social cohesion 
measure. While there is significant increase in conflict resolution (increase from 2.38 to 
2.46), there is also significant decrease in communal harmony (decrease from 2.65 to 
2.49). The social cohesion factor significantly decreased in rural (from 0.01 to -0.07) and 
urban areas (0.10 to 0.02). There is significant decrease in household-reported collective 
action in communities, between 2004-2005 and 2011-2012.  
Household characteristics: There are significant changes in many household 
characteristics in the 7-year period: per capita monthly household expenditures 
increased, household size and dependency ratio reduced, and highest adult male and 
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female education levels increased (though female education is lower than that of males). 
Hours of electricity access increased for rural areas but declined for urban households. 
Overall, house ownership significantly increased, including in urban areas, but it 
remained almost unchanged in the rural sample. Number of married women in rural 
households significantly decreased but significantly increased in urban households. 
Female headship increased over the 7-year time frame, but education level of the 
household head declined over time.  
Village characteristics: Among the 1,371 villages for which there are variables on 
market development and infrastructure, there are significant (p<0.01) increases in the 
four indicators used. Years of cable television access significantly increased from 2.06 to 
6.67 years. Access to roads increased between the two survey rounds (distance reduced 
from 1.56 to 0.51 kilometers), but access to financial institutions reduced (distance 
increased from 4.46 to 4.93 kilometers). Adjusting for inflation, villages reported 
significant decrease in per unit price of LPG cylinder (from 45.32 INR to 34.04 INR).  
Determinants of social capital 
Structural social capital 
In the full sample, there are significant (p<0.01) positive effects of bridging (both 
types), bonding, political participation, social cohesion and collective action on 
household-level linking score (Table 3.3). Except social cohesion, all other forms of 
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social capital have positive effects (p<0.01) on female-focused and activity-centric 
bridging and bonding scores. While structural social capital measures have a strong 
positive effect (p<0.01) on political participation (particularly higher in the rural sample; 
see Table B-2), collective action has a significant negative effect (p<0.01) on the same. 
Household-level factors that positively affect structural social capital include monthly 
per capita expenditure, household size, and highest male and female education. There 
are strong negative effects of number of married women in the household and 
dependency ratio on both categories of bridging. Female-headed households have 
significantly lower linking, bonding and political engagement scores. There is 
considerable variation in these results in the rural-urban disaggregated samples (Tables 
B-2 and B-3). Bridging and collective action have a higher positive effect (p<0.01) on 
linking among urban households, while bonding and political engagement have higher 
effects (p<0.01) on linking in the rural sample. The effect of other forms of social capital 
on bonding are stronger in the urban sample, while the effects are stronger for political 
participation in the rural sample. 
Cognitive social capital 
Collective action has a significant (p<0.01) positive effect on social cohesion in the 
combined rural-urban sample (Table 3.3). Linking, female-centric bridging and social 
cohesion positively affect collective action, while activity-based bridging, bonding and 
political engagement have strong negative effects (p<0.01). The significant effects of 
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other forms of social capital on social cohesion are stronger in the urban sample. In the 
aggregated sample, higher adult male education has strong positive effects on both 
social cohesion and collective action, while monthly per capita expenditure negatively 
affects only collective action.  
Fixed effects results 
Clean cooking 
There is a significant positive effect (Table 3.4, Columns 3 and 5) of linking score 
on households’ adoption of clean cooking across rural and urban samples (p<0.01). A 
unit increase in community linking score linearly increases the likelihood of household 
adoption of clean cooking by 1.6 percentage points in the rural sample and 5.8 
percentage points in the urban sample. Another component of structural social capital, 
female bridging score, significantly increases clean cooking adoption among rural 
households only by 3.7 percentage points (p<0.01). Contrarily, community activity-
based bridging linearly decreases rural households’ likelihood of clean cooking 
adoption by 7 percentage points. Bonding groups have a weak positive effect on clean 
cooking among rural households only (p<0.10). A unit increase in community political 
participation score linearly decreases clean cooking adoption among urban households 
only by 10.7 percentage points (p<0.01). Collective action has a significant negative 
effect (p<0.05) on clean cooking adoption among the rural sample only.  
 
83 
On including related EH behaviors in the models, I find that the effect (size and 
significance) of social capital, across measures, remains the same (Table 3.4, Columns 4 
and 6). Household toilet ownership significantly increases clean cooking adoption by 
3.2 percentage points in rural areas and by 7.5 percentage points in the urban sample 
(p<0.01). Safe treatment of drinking water significantly increases clean cooking adoption 
by a higher magnitude than toilet ownership: 6.6 percentage points in the rural sample 
and 7.1 percentage points in the urban sample (p<0.01).  
Toilet 
Community linking score has a significant negative effect (a unit increase in 
linking score linearly decreases toilet adoption by 2.5 percentage points; p<0.01) on 
rural households’ adoption of toilets (Table 3.5, Column 3), but not in the urban or 
aggregated samples. Activity-based bridging groups have a significantly positive effect 
on toilet ownership in the urban sample only (1.9 percentage points), (Table 3.5, 
Column 5). Caste- and religion-based group membership score significantly increases 
likelihood of toilet ownership by 1.7 percentage points in the full sample, and among 
rural households by 3.2 percentage points (p<0.05). Across samples, social cohesion has 
a significant positive effect on toilet ownership, with the effect being higher in urban 
households (2 percentage points; p<0.01) compared to rural households (1.3 percentage 
points; p<0.10). Surprisingly, collective action has a strong negative (p<0.05) effect on 
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toilet ownership in the aggregated (2.5 percentage points) and urban samples (4.6 
percentage points).  
Clean cooking ownership has a higher significant positive effect (p<0.01) on toilet 
ownership in rural areas (5.2 percentage points) than urban areas (3.5 percentage 
points) (Table 3.5, Columns 4 and 6). However, piped drinking water access has a 
stronger positive effect (p<0.01) on toilet adoption in the urban sample (3.3 percentage 
points) compared to its rural counterparts (2.7 percentage points).  
Piped drinking water 
Among urban households only, women-centric bridging group membership has 
a strong (p<0.01) negative effect on households’ piped drinking water access (4.7 
percentage points), while political participation score has a strong positive effect of 4.1 
percentage points (Table 3.6, Column 5). On cognitive social capital indicators, 
collective action positively affects (p<0.10) piped drinking water access in the total 
sample (2.7 percentage points). Toilet ownership linearly significantly (p<0.01) increases 
urban households’ likelihood of piped drinking water access by 4.2 percentage points 
and rural households’ access by 2.6 percentage points (Table 3.6, Columns 4 and 6).  
Robustness checks 
While the effect sizes are smaller, I find that the same measures of social capital 
that were significant in previous models (Tables 3.4-3,6) have strong effects on choice of 
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EH technologies in rural households, even after inclusion of village-level characteristics 
(Table 3.7). This is suggestive of the robustness of results from previous models. To 
elaborate further, village-level linking score has a strong positive effect (p<0.01) on clean 
cooking (1.2 percentage points) but not on toilet adoption in the rural sample. Village-
level female-driven bridging score has strong positive effects (p<0.01) on clean cooking 
take-up (3.1 percentage points), but village-level activity-based bridging score has 
significant (p<0.01) negative effects on the same (3.5 percentage points). Similar to the 
fixed effects models without village characteristics, in models with village factors as 
well, village-level bonding score has strong (p<0.01) positive effects on rural 
households’ toilet adoption (3.9 percentage points) and weak (p<0.10) positive effects on 
rural households’ piped drinking water access (1.7 percentage points).  The weak 
positive effect of social cohesion on rural households’ choice of toilets (1.3 percentage 
points) is consistent across model specifications. While the strong negative effect of 
collective action on rural households’ piped drinking water access is opposite and 
statistically significant compared to the results from the models without village 
characteristics, it is likely that rural households come together to solve drinking water 
problems in their communities, in the absence of piped drinking water provision.  
Falsification tests 
Falsification hypotheses are also tested to validate the relationship between 
social capital and household choice of EH technology. I test whether social capital 
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affects household ownership of durable goods that are welfare-improving but unrelated 
to the EH domain. These goods include mixer/grinder (similar to a blender), 
refrigerator, pressure cooker, color television, electric fan, cellphone and scooter. In the 
full sample, only community-level bonding score has a significant (p<0.01) positive 
effect on mixer/grinder and fridge ownership27. However, these coefficient estimates are 
small and no two social capital measures have strong significant effects on the same 
outcome (Table 3.8).   
Discussion 
Social capital has strong positive effects on household choice of EH technologies, 
with variation in type of social capital and geographic setting. Among structural social 
capital measures, effects of information from people outside one’s immediate social 
ambit-Granovetter’s (1973) definition of “weak ties”- differ by location. Linking social 
capital has positive effects on household choice of clean cooking (across samples). The 
strong negative effect of linking ties on rural households’ choice of latrines could be 
owing to network members’ negative experiences with toilet adoption, similar to Miller 
and Mobarak (2015) finding of households’ dependence on networks and opinion 
leaders for ICS (a new, clean energy product/technology) drawbacks, prior to investing 
in it. The evidence on gender-based group interaction and information dissemination 
                                                          
27These tests were conducted separately for rural and urban samples as well, and results are similar 
(results not presented).  
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varies by development outcome: Ramirez et al (2014) find women to be less active in 
communicating information about ICS, while Kumar et al (2017) find women’s group-
based programs to effectively create behavior change in infant and young child feeding 
practices. In this paper, the stronger positive effects of female bridging groups on clean 
cooking among rural households, may be attributed to the rural sample’s higher 
bridging scores across both rounds and women’s higher preferences for clean stoves, 
similar to Miller and Mobarak (2013) finding from rural Bangladesh. In line with 
literature that points to positive associations of development outcomes with bonding 
groups (Adrianzén 2014; Call and Jagger 2017; Kim et al 2006), this paper finds strong 
positive effects of bonding on toilet adoption and weak positive effects on clean 
cooking, particularly in rural areas. Ramirez et al (2014) argue that religious leaders in 
Honduras may have strengthened local information networks, thereby inhibiting 
adoption of ICS. However, in this paper, it is likely that Indian households in caste and 
religious groups have internalized behavior change given the proliferation of sanitation 
campaigns during the period of observation (2004-2012), and the cohesiveness of these 
groups has facilitated sharing of collective EH-improving goals. Additionally, similar to 
female bridging score, bonding score is also higher in the rural sample. While it is 
surprising that political participation has a significant negative effect on urban 
households’ choice of clean cooking but significant positive effects on the same sample’s 
piped drinking water access, it is important to consider that clean cooking, particularly 
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LPG, did not receive as much political traction as the push for clean water and 
sanitation did in the seven years between the surveys.  
Behavioral experiments in randomized controlled trials (RCTs) around social 
norms and neighbor comparison messages have found significant effects on reducing 
household energy consumption (Alcott 2011; Ayres et al 2012; Nolan et al 2008; Schultz 
et al 2007), increasing latrine adoption (Clasen et al 2014; Dickinson et al 2015; Patil et al 
2014; Pattanayak et al 2009; Pickering et al 2015) and reducing water use (Bernado et al 
2014; Ferraro et al 2011; Ferraro and Price 2013). In this paper, albeit in a non-
experimental setting, cognitive social capital has no consistent effect on household 
choice of clean cooking. However, the strong positive effect of social cohesion on toilet 
adoption finds support in results from community-led total sanitation (CLTS) RCTs that 
find positive impacts on toilet take-up (Clasen et al 2014; Dickinson et al 2015; Patil et al 
2014; Pattanayak et al 2009; Pickering et al 2015). In the analytic sample, continual 
sanitation messaging (from CLTS campaigns, government and non-government 
programs) over time may have translated into collective engagement with positive 
behavior change. The opposite effects of collective action on toilet adoption (negative) 
and piped drinking water (positive) point to concerns around survey questions that 
attempt to encapsulate rules that guide collective action. Respondents may have 
interpreted the collective action question to be more appropriate in the context of water 
provision than sanitation. It may not necessarily follow from these results that 
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households do not view sanitation as a ‘problem’ that they need to bond over to resolve. 
However, in the restricted rural sample with village characteristics, collective action has 
a strong negative effect on piped drinking water access. This may suggest that rural 
households are collectively resolving their drinking water problems through other 
sources, such as community tube wells or wells.  
While social capital effects are robust to inclusion of EH technologies, there exist 
strong complementarities between the three EH technologies under consideration. 
Toilets have higher positive effects on clean cooking in the urban sample, while clean 
cooking has higher positive effects on toilets across rural areas. The higher positive 
effect of drinking water treatment on household choice of clean cooking, compared to 
that of toilet adoption on clean cooking, particularly in rural areas, may be indicative of 
pairing of EH behaviors around cooking (i.e. choice of clean cooking and type of water 
treatment such as boiling). Since the survey does not ask households different drinking 
water treatment methods used, this claim cannot be validated. Toilets and piped 
drinking water have strong positive effects on each other, especially in urban areas. This 
is expected since toilet construction and piped drinking water connections are linked to 
infrastructure support, which is relatively better provided in urban settings.  
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 The strong positive effect of adult education28 particularly that of females on 
clean cooking adoption, is similar to findings from Lewis and Pattanayak (2012) meta-
analysis of ICS studies. Consistent with Coffey et al (2015) findings from rural India, I 
find that latrine take-up is positively affected by increase in number of married women. 
Electricity access has strong positive effects on toilet adoption and piped drinking water 
access, but strong negative effect on household choice of clean cooking. Though one 
would expect that infrastructure and markets for these public goods move together, it is 
likely that households in regions with access to, availability of and preference for 
electric stoves do not adopt LPG. Lewis et al (2015), for example, find sales of electric 
stoves to be higher, compared to other ICS, when households in Uttarakhand, India are 
given different ICS options. 
 These results should be interpreted with some considerations in mind. First, data 
are from a non-RCT context that does not involve behavioral or policy experiments 
intended to amplify social capital. This constrains the researcher to examine the 
complex sociological construct of social capital based on survey questions. As 
mentioned previously, a single collective action question, for example, may not 
encompass the operations of informal institutions within communities. Another survey-
related limitation is the lack of data on time (date/month/year) when households 
                                                          
28Household characteristics’ coefficients from fixed effects models not shown, for brevity. 
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switched behavior or started using a given EH technology. Information on timing 
would have enabled better analysis, as accrual of benefits from improved EH behavior 
is dependent on history of new technology use (Bandiera and Rasul 2002). Third, global 
positioning system (GPS) coordinates of households and community information 
sources would have allowed for measuring geographic distance between origins and 
beneficiaries of information; visual representation of spatial variation in social capital 
across communities would have improved analysis. Despite these data restraints, in 
using exploratory factor analysis, I create discrete indicators for social capital that are 
consistent with the literature (Chuang and Chuang 2008; Eriksson et al 2011; Perry et al 
2008; Story 2014) and internally reliable. As described previously, in the EH realm, 
experiments have been designed to change social norms and examine its long-term 
impact on intervention uptake. Future experiments could consider combining policy 
behavioral experiments with social network analysis for a holistic understanding of the 
impact of both forms of social capital- structural and cognitive- on EH adoption and its 
long-term impacts.    
Conclusion 
The empirical evidence in this paper provides insights into the vital role that 
social capital can play in EH technology adoption, the latter being central to combating 
the twin problems of household air pollution and unsafe water and sanitation. While 
previous studies have examined the impact of social networks (Adhvaryu 2014; 
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Beltramo et al 2014; Bonan et al 2017; Miller and Mobarak 2015; Ramirez et al 2014) and 
social norms (Clasen et al 2014; Dickinson et al 2015; Patil et al 2014; Pattanayak et al 
2009; Pickering et al 2015) on uptake of a single EH technology in specific settings, this 
paper provides evidence on the combined role of structural (social networks, group 
participation, political engagement) and cognitive (social cohesion, collective action) 
social capital in explaining various EH technologies across rural and urban India. While 
small in absolute terms, the positive social capital estimates in this paper point to the 
importance of building on the strengths of existing social groups and institutions to 
trigger behavior change. Vulturius and Wanjiru (2017) demonstrate higher ICS 
adoption when women’s SHGs and teachers are targeted.  
Community-led development interventions can have differing impacts 
depending on the nature of implementation, as evidenced in the sanitation literature. 
Teacher-provided CLTS, compared to CLTS using health workers and local leaders, in 
Ethiopia led to a lower decrease in open defecation (Crocker et al 2016), while resource 
agencies-implemented CLTS villages in Indonesia had higher toilet construction and 
intolerance towards open defecation compared to local governments-implemented 
CLTS villages (Cameron and Shah 2017). Leveraging existing social networks and 
community groups’ efforts has the potential to sustain behavior change. Recent 
evidence from India finds social norms-based community interventions to have strong 
long-term impacts on sustained latrine adoption and cognitive development impacts, 
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particularly for girls (Orgill 2017). Current national policy advances in clean cooking 
and safe sanitation in India could potentially disseminate information through social 
groups (e.g. SHGs) and existing group-based programs, such as the integrated child 
development services, and accredited social health activists. As the LPG schemes phase 
their district-wise rollout and state governments design their respective sanitation 
programs, there is potential for researchers to collaborate with state governments in 
designing experiments, to examine which social processes and groups are most effective 
in increasing LPG and toilet uptake and subsequently sustaining use.  
 
 





Table 3.1. Summary statistics for outcome variables: Environmental health technologiesƗ 














Non-biomass stove 26.8 37.3 9.1 17.8 60.9 75.0 
LPG mainly used for 
cooking 
29.3 40.1 17.8 27.8 51.5 63.9 
Clean cooking energy (use 
of LPG fuel and non-
biomass stove) 
16.7 28.7 5.0 14.2 39.3 56.7 
Toilet ownership 44.0 56.0 28.1 41.9 74.5 83.1 
Piped drinking water 44.4 47.0 30.4 34.7 71.4 70.8 







Table 3.2. Summary statistics: Explanatory and control variablesƗ, ƗƗ 














PANEL A: Explanatory variables - Social capital 
Structural social capital              
Linking              
Among your acquaintances and relatives, any in these professions (%): 
Health 31.2 56.7 29.1 53.1 35.1 63.6 
Education 39.3 59.5 38.4 57.2 41.2 64.0 
Government service 33.6 30.4 28.7 26.4 43.0 38.3 
Anyone in the household belongs to these groups (%): 
Female-centric bridging groups             
Mahila mandal / Women's group 7.4 9.1 8.6 9.4 5.1 8.4 
Self-Help Group 9.5 19.3 11.3 22.1 6.1 14.0 
Credit/Savings  7.0 11.2 7.9 11.5 5.3 10.7 
Activity-based bridging groups       
Youth/Sports/Reading 4.9 2.6 4.4 2.0 6.0 3.8 
Trade Union/Business/Professional 4.7 5.3 3.0 3.3 8.1 9.1 
Bonding groups       
Religious 13.6 11.6 14.4 11.2 12.1 12.4 
Caste Association 12.8 8.8 14.0 8.8 10.4 9.0 
Political participation       
Any household member attended public 
meeting in the last year (%) 
28.7 28.9 35.8 37.1 15.0 13.0 
Any household member is a government 
official (%) 
10.3 3.9 12.7 5.0 5.6 1.8 
Cognitive social capital        
Social cohesion       
People generally get along with each other 
(3=no conflict, 2=some conflict, 1=lot of 
conflict) 
2.38 (0.74) 2.46 (0.71) 2.37 (0.74) 2.44 (0.70) 2.40 (0.73) 2.48 (0.72) 
Castes and sub-castes in the community 
get along with each other (3=no conflict, 
2=some conflict, 1=lot of conflict) 







Collective action              
People bond to solve local problems (%) 57.2 72.6 59.0 74.0 53.7 70.0 
Factor Analysis Scores (Household-level)             
Linking  -0.22 (0.98) 0.22 (0.97) -0.28 (0.96) 0.14 (0.96) -0.10 (1.01) 0.38 (0.96) 
Female-centric bridging -0.14 (0.89) 0.14 (1.08) -0.07 (0.95) 0.20 (1.11) -0.27 (0.73) 0.02 (1.02) 
Activity-based bridging 0.07 (1.05) -0.07 (0.94) -0.02 (0.93) -0.16 (0.78) 0.22 (1.24) 0.11 (1.17) 
Bonding 0.07 (1.05) -0.07 (0.94) 0.10 (1.09) -0.08 (0.93) 0.01 (0.97) -0.05 (0.96) 
Political participation 0.10 (1.11) -0.10 (0.87) 0.26 (1.19) 0.04 (0.94) -0.21 (0.85) -0.37 (0.64) 
Social cohesion 0.04 (0.91) -0.04 (1.08) 0.01 (0.91) -0.07 (1.07) 0.10 (0.89) 0.02 (1.10) 
PANEL B: Control variables 














Number of married women 1.25 (0.71) 1.24 (0.74) 1.30 (0.75) 1.27 (0.75) 1.16 (0.62) 1.18 (0.69) 
Number of household members 5.34 (2.52) 4.97 (2.41) 5.52 (2.66) 5.04 (3.49) 4.98 (2.19) 4.83 (2.23) 
Highest male adult education (in years) 6.81 (5.13) 7.38 (5.30) 5.81 (4.90) 6.39 (5.11) 8.73 (5.01) 9.29 (5.12) 
Highest female adult education (in years) 4.51 (4.99) 5.56 (5.33) 3.28 (4.33) 4.32 (4.83) 6.89 (5.31) 7.94 (5.43) 
Dependency ratio 0.74 (0.70) 0.61 (0.66) 0.79 (0.73) 0.65 (0.70) 0.63 (0.64) 0.53 (0.59) 
Female household head (%) 9.3 16.0 9.0 16.2 9.9 15.6 
Age of household head (in years) 46.33 (11.72) 52.11 (12.15) 46.68 (11.78) 52.47 (12.26) 45.66 (11.58) 51.40 (11.91) 
Own house (%) 90.9 91.6 98.0 98.1 77.1 79.2 
Electricity access hours/day 12.51 (9.05) 13.36 (8.19) 9.85 (8.71) 11.36 (8.10) 17.62 (7.33) 17.22 (6.87) 
Safe treatment of drinking water 8.3 12.6 4.9 8.9 14.9 19.8 
PANEL C: Village variables 
   
IHDS-I 
(N=1,371) 
IHDS-II      
(N=1,371) 
  
Years of cable television access   2.05 (4.34) 6.67 (5.89)   
Distance to nearest road (in kilometers)   1.56 (4.05) 0.51 (2.10)   
Distance to nearest bank branch/credit 
cooperative (in kilometers) 
  4.46 (5.20) 4.93 (5.23)   
LPG price per unit (INR/kg)   45.32 (22.17) 34.03 (14.65)   
NOTE: Ɨ Standard deviation in parentheses for continuous variables. ƗƗ All variables are significantly different across survey rounds (1% significance level), 








Table 3.3. Determinants of social capital (Full sample): Household FE regression results 
  Structural social capital Cognitive social capital 














Structural social capital (household-level)  
Linking/Networks score 
 0.010** 0.050*** 0.037*** 0.059*** 0.010** 0.057*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Female-centric bridging groups score 0.019***  0.053*** 0.071*** 0.044*** -0.007 0.054*** 
 (0.004)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Activity-based bridging groups score 0.044*** 0.045***  0.069*** 0.025*** -0.002 -0.029*** 
 (0.004) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
Bonding groups score 0.028*** 0.058*** 0.067***  0.029*** 0.004 -0.042*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Political participation score 0.052*** 0.036*** 0.025*** 0.033***  0.003 -0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.003) 
Cognitive social capital (household-level)  
Social cohesion score 
0.017*** -0.004 -0.003 0.004 0.004  0.049*** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.002) 
Collective action 
0.202*** 0.174*** -0.125*** -0.168*** -0.063*** 0.229***  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)  
Household characteristics        
Log of per capita monthly total 
expenditures  
0.144*** 0.045*** 0.060*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.008 -0.009** 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) 
Number of married women 
-0.009 -0.026*** -0.024** -0.013 -0.018 -0.014 0.004 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.005) 
Number of household members 
0.021*** 0.026*** 0.018*** 0.008** 0.020*** 0.004 -0.003* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Highest male adult education  
  
0.010*** 0.002 0.006*** 0.001 0.004** 0.004*** 0.001** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Highest female adult education 
  
0.008*** 0.005*** -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 







  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
Female household head 
  
-0.043*** -0.011 -0.011 -0.042*** -0.083*** 0.021 0.011 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.009) 
Age of household head 
  
0.001 -0.002*** -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002** -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Round 2 
-0.043*** -0.002 -0.022*** -0.011* -0.040*** -0.055*** -0.034*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
Constant 
  
-1.373*** -0.448*** -0.416*** -0.244*** -0.381*** -0.318*** 0.136*** 
(0.072) (0.076) (0.082) (0.078) (0.085) (0.077) (0.039) 
Observations 71,236 71,236 71,236 71,236 71,236 71,236 71,236 
Adjusted R-squared 0.480 0.315 0.314 0.461 0.266 0.489 0.428 
NOTE: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Community-level measures of social capital are also included 












Table 3.4. Effect of social capital on clean cooking: Household FE regression results 
  Total Rural Urban 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Structural social capital(community-level)   
Linking/Networks score 
0.029*** 0.029*** 0.016** 0.017** 0.058*** 0.057*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.017) (0.017) 
Female-centric bridging groups 
score 
0.020** 0.020** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.001 0.004 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) 
Activity-based bridging groups 
score 
-0.027*** -0.026*** -0.070*** -0.069*** 0.007 0.007 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) 
Bonding groups score 
0.006 0.004 0.011* 0.010* -0.019 -0.022 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) 
Political participation score 
-0.025*** -0.024*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.107*** -0.107*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.022) (0.022) 
Cognitive social capital (community-level) 
Social cohesion score 
0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.000 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) 
Collective action 
-0.021 -0.018 -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.015 -0.009 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.030) (0.030) 
Related EH behaviors (household-level) 
Toilet/individual household 
latrine 
 0.043***  0.032***  0.075*** 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.017) 
Piped drinking water 
 0.005  0.000  0.024 
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.016) 
Safe treatment of drinking water  
 0.072***  0.066***  0.071*** 
 (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.018) 
Observations 71,236 71,236 46,908 46,908 24,328 24,328 
Adjusted R-squared 0.073 0.078 0.081 0.086 0.093 0.099 
NOTE: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Household characteristics controlled: log of per 
capita monthly total expenditures, number of married women, number of household members, highest adult education (male and 








Table 3.5. Effect of social capital on toilets: Household FE regression results 
  Total Rural Urban 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Structural social capital (community-level)  
Linking/Networks score 
-0.019*** -0.020*** -0.026*** -0.027*** 0.002 -0.000 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Female-centric bridging groups 
score 
0.007 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.014 0.015 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Activity-based bridging groups 
score 
0.004 0.005 -0.013 -0.009 0.018** 0.018** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Bonding groups score 
0.017*** 0.017*** 0.032*** 0.031*** -0.007 -0.006 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Political participation score 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 0.010 0.013 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) 
Cognitive social capital (community-level) 
Social cohesion score 
0.017*** 0.017*** 0.013* 0.013* 0.021*** 0.021*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Collective action 
-0.025** -0.025** -0.013 -0.012 -0.047*** -0.047** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
Related EH behaviors (household-level) 
Clean cooking 
  0.040***  0.054***  0.036*** 
  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.008) 
Piped drinking water 
  0.032***  0.026***  0.034*** 
  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
Safe treatment of drinking water  
  0.000  0.003  0.003 
  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.008) 
Observations 71,236 71,236 46,908 46,908 24,328 24,328 
Adjusted R-squared 0.079 0.082 0.095 0.098 0.057 0.061 
NOTE:  Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Household characteristics controlled: log of 
per capita monthly total expenditures, number of married women, number of household members, highest adult education (male 
and female, separately), dependency ratio, household head demographics (age, sex), house ownership and hours of daily 








Table 3.6. Effect of social capital on piped drinking water: Household FE regression results 
  Total Rural Urban 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Structural social capital (community-level)  
Linking/Networks score 
-0.008 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Female-centric bridging groups 
score 
-0.018* -0.019* -0.004 -0.004 -0.047*** -0.047*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Activity-based bridging groups score 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 0.002 0.002 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
Bonding groups score 
0.003 0.002 0.013* 0.012 -0.013 -0.012 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Political participation score 
0.018* 0.018* 0.012 0.012 0.040** 0.041** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) 
Cognitive social capital (community-level)  
Social cohesion score 
0.001 0.000 0.005 0.004 -0.005 -0.006 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Collective action 
0.027* 0.029* 0.036* 0.037* 0.013 0.015 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Related EH behaviors (household-level) 
Clean cooking 
 0.005  0.014  0.015 
 (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.010) 
Toilet/individual household latrine 
 0.034***  0.000  0.043*** 
 (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Safe treatment of drinking water  
 0.003  0.026***  -0.004 
 (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Observations 71,236 71,236 46,908 46,908 24,328 24,328 
Adjusted R-squared 0.009 0.010 0.015 0.016 0.009 0.011 
NOTE: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Household characteristics controlled: log of 
per capita monthly total expenditures, number of married women, number of household members, highest adult education 
(male and female, separately), dependency ratio, household head demographics (age, sex), house ownership and hours of 








Table 3.7. Effect of social capital on EH technologies: Household FE results (Rural sample only) 
  Clean cooking Toilet Piped DW 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Structural social capital (community-level)         
Linking/Networks score 
0.012** 0.012** -0.012 -0.013 0.002 0.003 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Female-centric bridging groups score 
0.033*** 0.031*** 0.002 0.001 -0.015 -0.015 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) 
Activity-based bridging groups score 
-0.035*** -0.035*** -0.011 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) 
Bonding groups score 
0.004 0.003 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.017* 0.016* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Political participation score 
-0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 0.009 0.009 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Cognitive social capital (community-level)         
Social cohesion score 
-0.010** -0.010** 0.013* 0.013* 0.003 0.003 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Collective action 
0.008 0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.049** -0.049** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023) 
Related EH behaviors (household-level)         
Clean cooking 
   0.052***  -0.003 
   (0.012)  (0.013) 
Toilet/individual household latrine 
 0.029***    0.025** 
 (0.007)    (0.010) 
Piped drinking water 
 -0.002  0.025**   
 (0.007)  (0.011)   
Safe treatment of drinking water 
 0.049***  0.005  0.013 
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
Observations 40,297 40,297 40,297 40,297 40,297 40,297 
Adjusted R-squared 0.085 0.088 0.102 0.104 0.018 0.019 
NOTE: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In addition to household characteristics included in 
previous models, village characteristics controlled for: years of cable TV access, distance to tarred road and bank branch, and LPG per 









Table 3.8. Falsification tests-Effect of social capital on durable goods: Household FE regression results (Total 
sample) 








Structural social capital (community-level)           
Linking/Networks score 
0.006* -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.000 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Female-centric bridging groups 
score 
0.003 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.005 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
Activity-based bridging groups 
score 
-0.007* -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.004 0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) 
Bonding groups score 
0.006** 0.008*** 0.004 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Political participation score 
0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.004 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Cognitive social capital (community-level)           
Social cohesion score 
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(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Collective action 
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Observations 71,236 71,236 71,236 71,236 71,236 71,236 71,236 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
NOTE: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Household characteristics controlled: 
log of per capita monthly total expenditures, number of married women, number of household members, highest adult 
education (male and female, separately), dependency ratio, household head demographics (age, sex), house ownership, 
household bank account ownership and hours of daily electricity access. For all 7 durable goods, analyses were also done 
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CHAPTER 4: HOUSEHOLD AIR POLLUTION (HAP), MICROENVIRONMENT 
AND CHILD HEALTH: STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATING HAP EXPOSURE IN 
URBAN RWANDA 
Introduction  
 Approximately 3 billion people, mostly in low-income countries, use solid fuels 
(wood, agricultural residue, dung, charcoal and coal) for cooking and heating (WHO 
2016). Though there has been a decline in the relative share of the global population 
using solid fuels (dropping from 62% to 41% between 1980 and 2010), owing to 
population growth and thin or missing markets for improved cooking fuels and 
technologies (GACC 2017), the absolute number of solid fuel users has remained high. 
Close to 646 million people using solid fuels reside in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and the 
absolute number of users is expected to continue to increase through 2030 (Bonjour et al 
2015). Burning solid fuels in three-stone fires or other traditional stoves exposes 
households to health-damaging pollutants, namely fine particulate matter (PM2.5), 
carbon monoxide (CO), and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (Bruce et al 2000). The 
resulting household air pollution (HAP) accounts for 3.7-4.8 million deaths, as per 
WHO estimates, while the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) Study estimates between 2.2 
million to 3.6 million deaths from HAP (Landrigan et al 2018). HAP-related illnesses 
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responsible for millions of these deaths include stroke (34%), ischemic heart disease 
(26%), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (22%), pneumonia (12%), and lung cancer 
(6%) (WHO 2016).  
 In low-income countries, acute lower respiratory infection is the major cause of 
death among children under 5 years (under-fives) (Smith et al 2014), and lower 
respiratory infection was the leading cause of death across all age groups in 2016 (GBD 
2016 Causes of Death Collaborators 2017). Pneumonia, a type of acute respiratory 
infection (ARI), is one of the leading causes of death among under-fives (15%); in 2015, 
it accounted for approximately 920,000 deaths in this age group (WHO 2016). Over half 
of the premature deaths from pneumonia among under-fives were caused by HAP 
(WHO 2016). As children typically spend a large amount of time with mothers and 
caregivers who also have cooking responsibilities, under-fives experience relatively 
high levels of HAP exposure (Gordon et al 2014). Infants and young children are 
particularly susceptible to severe respiratory infections (e.g. inflamed lung airways and 
alveoli) from HAP pollutants due to their undeveloped respiratory defense mechanisms 
and airways (Smith et al 2014). Biomass fuel use is also associated with prevalence of 
anemia (Mishra and Retherford 2006) and stunting in under-fives (Mishra and 
Retherford 2006; Kyu et al 2009). In more recent evidence, solid fuel use leads to lower 
height-for-age, and increases probability of stunting and severe stunting in Indian 
children under 3 years (Balietti and Datta 2017).  
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 Since 2010, 80.9 million clean or efficient stoves and fuels, that emit lower indoor 
emissions and use less fuel, respectively, have been distributed (GACC 2017). However, 
their sustained and exclusive adoption remains a challenge. Addressing market barriers 
to encourage production, distribution and use of clean cooking technologies is an 
ongoing, long-term goal for all stakeholders and partners in the clean cooking and 
energy sector. In the interim, changes to house construction (Bruce et al 2004) and 
modifications to cooking area ventilation (Yadama et al 2012) are alternative or additive 
solutions. Balakrishnan et al (2002) find type of fuel (fuelwood vs. kerosene or LPG) to 
be the most important determinant of HAP in rural southern India, in addition to 
cooking area location (indoor vs. outdoor) and kitchen ventilation. In Malawi, use of 
firewood or crop residue for cooking, compared to charcoal use, is associated with 
higher odds of primary cooks experiencing cardiopulmonary and neurologic symptoms 
(Das et al 2016). Jagger and Shively (2014) find a higher ARI incidence among under-
fives in Ugandan households using fuelwood from non-forest areas, but the opposite 
correlation in households using crop residues for cooking. While type of fuel/stove is 
the most important determinant of kitchen CO in Bruce et al (2004) study in rural 
Guatemala, they also find significant positive associations between eave space size, 
kitchen volume and kitchen CO, but no independent relationship between kitchen 
volume and young (under 18 months) children’s CO exposure. 
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 Cooking location can have a large observed effect on exposure and health 
(Langbien 2017). Median exposure reductions of 57-73% have been observed when 
comparing indoor and outdoor kitchens (Rosa et al 2014). Others find 93-98% reductions 
in PM2.5 1-hour concentrations and 83-95% reductions in CO concentrations when 
comparing open versus closed kitchens, through increased air exchange rates in open 
kitchens (Grabow et al 2013). Land-use regression studies examining spatial differences 
in outdoor air pollution find population density to be one of the significant predictors of 
PM and other pollutants (Hoek et al 2008). Laboratory-based investigations suggest that 
improvements in ventilation (e.g. building design, wind speed and direction) may lead 
to reductions in exposure equivalent to those estimated for improved cookstoves (ICS) 
intervention studies (Ruth et al 2014). Studies examining this relationship have found no 
significant effect of increasing permeability of roof or walls on human health (Pitt et al 
2006), while others find that additional ventilation is associated with a 12% reduction in 
tracheobronchial particle index in the household, after controlling for ICS stove 
(Yadama et al 2012). 
 The only structural factors included in Dherani et al (2008) meta-analyses on 
HAP and under-fives’s risk of pneumonia, were stove type (improved vs. traditional) 
and cooking or heating location (inside vs. outside house). Under-five children in 
Malawi residing in improved homes (fired mud brick walls, tile roofing and concrete 
foundation) have significantly lower odds of experiencing respiratory, gastrointestinal 
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or malaria-related illnesses, compared to those in traditional houses with mud brick 
walls, thatch roofing and hard packed mud floors (Wolff et al 2001). Cattaneo et al (2008) 
find that Mexico’s Piso Firme program (that offered households with dirt floors a 
maximum of 538 square feet of concrete cement floors) significantly decreased incidence 
of parasitic infestations and diarrhea, prevalence of anemia, and significantly improved 
cognitive development among children aged 0-5 years. Northridge et al (2010) study in 
New York City find that children residing in private (vs. public) housing have 
significantly lower odds of asthma. Household crowding may predispose children to 
viral respiratory illnesses, and housing construction changes have increased indoor 
allergen exposure (Wright and Fisher 2003). Globally, solid fuel combustion from 
household cooking accounts for 12% of ambient fine particulate air pollution, the 
highest (37%) being in SSA (Chafe et al 2014). In a densely populated slum community 
in Bangladesh, Chowdhury et al (2012) find reductions in personal exposures from ICS, 
but high neighborhood PM2.5 concentrations, suggesting a need for community-wide 
improved energy solutions. Researchers have argued for the need to study the effects of 
exchange between outdoor and indoor microenvironments on area concentrations and 
personal exposures (Clark et al 2013). 
 Among school children in Nottingham, United Kingdom (UK) living within 150 
meters of a main road, wheezing risk significantly increased with increasing main road 
proximity (Venn et al 2001). Gehring et al (2010) find significant positive correlations 
 
118 
between traffic-linked air pollution (PM2.5, NO2, soot) at birth address and asthma-
related symptoms among Dutch children observed from birth till 8 years. In southern 
California, McConnell et al (2010) find kindergarten and first-grade children with high 
asthma risk from modeled road traffic-related pollutants. Computer modeling studies 
show that trees and shrubs remove vast proportions of air pollutants (O3, PM10, NO2, 
SO2 and CO) that in turn improve urban air quality. Gaseous air pollutants are 
eliminated mainly through leaf stomata or plant surface, and absorption by trees 
(Nowak et al 2006). Using an atmospheric transport model, McDonald et al (2007) find 
that increasing tree cover in two UK conurbations reduces PM10 air concentrations. 
Nowak et al (2014) in their simulation study find that trees and forests in the United 
States removed 17.4 million tons of air pollution in 2010, and 670,000 incidences of ARI 
symptoms were avoided, primarily in urban areas. 
 While previous studies have considered some housing structure factors (cooking 
location, building design, roof/wall permeability, stove type) in areas of high HAP 
exposure, not all studies consider health end-points as the main outcomes of interest. 
Second, no study has considered the interplay of all the aforementioned factors; and 
third, none has been conducted in SSA. As the empirical evidence on the role of 
household structural factors and the neighborhood environment on human health, in 
areas of high HAP exposure, is limited and inconclusive, this paper estimates the 
association between microenvironment and young children’s health in urban Rwandan 
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households that primarily use biomass cooking fuel. Rwanda is the most densely 
populated country in SSA, with a population density of 481.7 per square kilometer 
(United Nations Statistics Division 2017); lower respiratory infection is the leading 
cause of years of life lost (GBD 2016 Causes of Death Collaborators 2017), and over 95% 
of the population use biomass for cooking (GACC 2016). Though Rwanda made 
significant progress in achieving an under-five mortality rate of 54/1000 live births in 
2013, stunting in under-fives is still high at 44% (WHO 2015). The Government of 
Rwanda has made strides in improving access to clean water and sanitation, and rural 
roads, and is now prioritizing increasing geographical access to health facilities (WHO 
2015). 
 In addition to examining the association between the microenvironment and 
prevalence of child health symptoms, we test the hypothesis that in households where 
the primary caregiver of a young child is also the household primary cook, there is 
likely to be a stronger association between caregiver’s CO exposure (as a proxy for 
child’s exposure) and children’s HAP-related health symptoms. In defining the 
household microenvironment, we consider crowding in the immediate vicinity of the 
household, cooking location, indicators of cooking area ventilation, distance to any 
road-paved or unpaved (as a proxy for dust and motor vehicle emissions) and 
percentage tree cover around households. We hypothesize positive associations 
between agglomerated dwellings, unventilated cooking areas, low quality kitchen 
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We use baseline data from an ongoing randomized controlled trial of an 
improved household energy initiative in Gisenyi Sector, Rubavu District in Rwanda’s 
Western Province. We collected data in June 2015 for 1462 urban households across 22 
purposively selected Umudugudus (neighborhoods/sub-divisions) in 2 cells29 (Bugoyi 
and Kivumu) of Gisenyi town. The sample for this paper includes 694 under-fives 
residing in 529 households.   
At baseline, an extensive survey was administered, with 17 modules including 
household demographics; physical characteristics of housing and kitchen structure, and 
cooking technology; health of children and primary cooks; cooking history of primary 
cooks; time use and preferences; and household expenditure. For each household, we 
also collected GPS coordinates and objectively measured 24-hour CO exposure of the 
                                                          
29Cells are the second-lowest level of administration in Rwanda, above village. The political-






primary cook. The primary cooks wore the CO data logger30 (EL-USB-CO, Lascar 
Electronics) by use of a lanyard or a clip, continuously for 24 hours, except while 
bathing and sleeping.  Of the full sample of 1462 households, 28 households refused to 
participate in the CO monitoring. Valid CO exposure information was collected from 
78.7% of the study households (N=1150). The remaining CO data files downloaded from 
the CO data loggers were unusable owing to batteries of data loggers dying prior to the 
end of the 24-hour monitoring period and inability to match CO data loggers’ files with 
the database.  The data loggers recorded CO concentrations once per minute. From each 
of the data files, a 24-hour average and hourly averages were calculated for each 
household with children under five (N=529). 
Geospatial information about paved and unpaved roads for the study area were 
obtained from open access OpenStreetMap (OSM) data (OpenStreetMap contributors 
2015). OSM is volunteered geographic information containing extensive vector data for 
many African countries. The validity and completeness of the data were assessed using 
a map compare tool (http://tools.geofabrik.de/mc) and by overlaying the extracted 
vector information on the available Google satellite imagery. The paved and unpaved 
                                                          
30The CO data loggers record readings from 0 to 1000 ppm in 0.5 ppm increments and have a reported 
accuracy of ±7 ppm. All of these loggers were calibrated before and after the three-month field sampling 
period.  Calibration involved placing the CO data loggers in a sealed chamber that had a small mixing 
fan, an inlet line for a calibration gas (200 ppm CO in air), and an outlet line to a fume hood. A correction 
factor was developed for each data logger based on its average maximum readings relative to the 
calibration gas before and after the field sampling period. 
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roads were differentiated using attribute information stored in the feature tags as 
'surface'='paved' or 'surface'='unpaved'. The distance to the nearest paved, unpaved and 
any road for each household was calculated using the 'Near' tool in the ArcGIS toolbox 
(ArcGIS version 10.3). The tree cover data were extracted from the freely available 
(ftp://ftp.glcf.umd.edu/glcf/LandsatTreecover/WRS2) LandSat WRS2 30m percentage 
tree cover data for 2015 (Sexton et al 2013). The percentage of tree cover around each 
household (30-meter resolution) was calculated using the 'Extract values to point' tool in 
the ArcGIS toolbox (ArcGIS version 10.3) by assigning the pixel value to the household 
point located in the corresponding pixel. Figure 4.1 shows our sampled villages, their 
proximity to roads and tree cover in the study area. 
Measures 
The binary outcomes for analysis, asked to the mother or the person most 
knowledgeable about an under-five, based on 2-weeks recall include prevalence of the 
following HAP-related health symptoms: respiratory infection, illness with cough, 
difficulty breathing and dry eyes. The only non-HAP-related health symptom we include 
in our analysis is fever. 
The main explanatory variables indicative of housing structure and cooking 
location are (a) type of dwelling, (b) cooking location, and (c) kitchen floor material. For 
households that do not cook fully outdoors, we include specifics on cooking area 
ventilation, namely, (a) kitchen roof presence, (b) gap between walls and ceiling, (c) 
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number of windows, (d) presence of ventilation holes, and (e) presence of active chimney 
to remove cooking area smoke. We include the main type of stove used in the past 30 
days as a key determinant of HAP exposure, and determinants of other environmental 
exposures such as distance (in meters) to the nearest road (paved or unpaved road)31 and 
tree cover. We also control for individual-level characteristics such as age, sex, and health 
card availability of child (suggesting access to healthcare); and age, sex, and education 
level of the main respondent (as a proxy for household head). Household characteristics 
controlled for include log of per capita total expenditure in the past 4 weeks, household 
size, and weekly charcoal use per capita. For 367 children where the caregiver is the 
primary cook in the household, caregiver’s CO exposure is the main explanatory variable.  
Empirical strategy 
First, we use a logit model to estimate the likelihood of caregiver-reported health 




1 + 𝑒−(𝛽0+𝛽1𝐷𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒,𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒+𝛽2𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠+Ω𝑖+𝛼𝑗+𝜀𝑖𝑗)
 
                                                          
31 Though we have data on distance to tarmac road and dust road, we use ‘distance to any road’ instead, 
as majority households (98%) are closer to an unpaved road than a paved road (see Figure 4.1). As of 




Where Yij denotes a health symptom for child ‘i’ in household ‘j’; Ωi represents 
confounding variables at the individual-level, αj denotes potential household-level 
confounding variables and εij is the error term.  
Second, in the model above, we include a continuous variable for the log of daily 
average CO concentration of the caregiver as the main explanatory variable. We run both 
models in the full sample without cooking area specifics, and in the sub-sample of 
households not cooking fully outdoors, with specific cooking area variables.   
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
We find high prevalence of illness with cough (36.2%) and illness with fever 
(29.1%) in our sample of under-fives (Table 4.1a). The cardiopulmonary symptom of 
difficulty breathing was prevalent among 20.2% children, and respiratory infection was 
least prevalent at 12.2%. As there are no statistically significant differences in symptom 
prevalence among younger (0-23 months) and older (24-59 months) under-fives32, we do 
not analyze these age groups separately.  
The average per capita monthly total expenditure is RWF 56,551 (~$66.9), average 
household size is 6, 94.3% households use a portable or fixed charcoal stove, and on 
average households use 3 kg of charcoal per capita per week (Table 4.1b). The majority 
                                                          




of main respondents are women (88.7%), the average age is 33.6 years, 42.2% have 
attained secondary education and 61.1% are aware of the negative health consequences 
from burning biomass fuels in traditional stoves. The average age of under-fives is 27.2 
months, 49% are girls and 92% children have a health card. More than half of the 
households in the sample (57.7%) reside in group of multiple enclosed dwellings33, 
followed by group of single dwellings (21.4%). Over 55% households primarily cook in 
a designated kitchen outside their dwelling, close to 21% cook fully inside their 
dwelling, while 13% cook fully outdoors. An approximately equal share of households 
has cemented (41.6%) and brick floors (40.5%) in their cooking area. Among households 
that do not cook fully outdoors, 70% have a kitchen roof; in the cooking area, 19% have 
a gap between walls and ceilings, 43% have ventilation holes, and only 4% have an 
active chimney to remove smoke. On average, households have less than one window 
in their designated kitchen.  
Households, on average, are 9 meters away from the nearest road (either paved 
or unpaved), and have 7.3% tree cover in their surrounding area. Primary caregivers’ 
daily average CO concentration is 6.8 parts per million (ppm).  In addition to 24-hour 
average CO concentrations, hourly average CO concentrations were calculated for each 
                                                          
33 Group of single enclosed dwellings are single households within a shared, walled compound. Group of 
multiple enclosed dwellings include multiple housing structures within a common, walled compound. 
These classifications were taken from the Rwanda Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey 
administered by the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda. 
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hour of the day for each caregiver.  Community patterns were determined by compiling 
hourly averages across all caregivers as shown in Figure 4.2.  We find that, on average 
across the community, the caregivers' CO exposures are low overnight and in the early 
morning with peaks mid-day and in the early evening. The WHO hourly average air 
quality guidelines (AQG) for CO is 35 mg/m3 (equivalent to 36.4 ppm in 
Gisenyi).  While only 4.1% of all of the caregivers' hourly average concentrations, over 
the 24-hour monitoring period, exceeded the WHO AQG, 35.8% of the caregivers were 
exposed to CO concentrations exceeding the WHO AQG for at least one hour during 
the same period. 
Regression results  
We find a strong positive association between group of multiple enclosed 
dwellings, relative to single house, and under-five children’s HAP-related symptoms 
(respiratory infection, difficulty breathing and dry eyes) and the non-HAP-related fever 
symptom experienced in the past 2 weeks (Table 4.2). Multiple house and group of 
single enclosed dwellings, compared to single house, have strong positive associations 
with dry eyes only. Relative to cooking fully outdoors, cooking partially outdoors (e.g. 
in the verandah) has a weak negative association with children experiencing illness 
with cough. Consistent with the literature, we find that cooking indoors is associated 
with significantly higher prevalence of most health symptoms. In the truncated sample 
of households not cooking fully outdoors, cooking either in a designated kitchen 
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outside the main dwelling, or cooking fully inside the main house is associated with 
significantly higher likelihood of children experiencing illness with cough, difficulty 
breathing and fever.  
Compared to children in households with beaten earth floor in cooking areas, 
those in households with clay tiled floors have higher likelihood (weak significance) of 
experiencing respiratory infection. In the sub-sample of households not cooking fully 
outdoors, cemented cooking area floors have a weak protective effect on children’s 
respiratory infection symptom, relative to earth floors; there is a significant positive 
association between gap in walls and ceiling in cooking areas and difficulty breathing. 
While there is a strong positive association between number of windows and 
respiratory infection, there is a very strong negative association between cooking area 
ventilation holes and illness with cough, difficulty breathing and fever. 
We find a weak positive association between distance to any road and 
prevalence of respiratory infection in the full sample of under-fives, but a strong 
positive association in the truncated sample of under-fives in households that do not 
cook fully outdoors. In the sub-sample, tree cover has a strong positive association with 
prevalence of respiratory infection and difficulty breathing but weak positive 
association with prevalence of dry eyes.   
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On including an objective measure of HAP exposure (24-hour average CO 
concentration in ppm) of the primary caregiver, to examine its relationship with child 
health symptoms (Table 4.3), we find strong positive associations between log of 
caregiver’s daily average CO concentration, and difficulty breathing and dry eyes. 
Contrary to what we would expect, in the sub-sample, presence of an active chimney in 
the cooking area, significantly increases children’s likelihood of experiencing 
respiratory infection. Distance to the nearest road significantly increases children’s 
likelihood of experiencing all HAP-related symptoms except illness with cough.  Tree 
cover has strong positive associations with respiratory infection and difficulty 
breathing. Similar to the model without average CO concentration, the significance of 
the associations between child health symptoms, and dwelling type, cooking location, 
kitchen floor material, gap between walls and ceiling in the cooking area, and presence 
of ventilation holes persist.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
The importance of studying the association between housing structure and 
neighborhood environment is two-fold. First, the results have pertinent implications for 
policy-makers as they consider infrastructure-related interventions to reduce HAP 
exposure, in conjunction with promoting improved access to modern household energy 
services. Second, in exploring the role of the neighborhood on human health in the 
context of HAP, there is potential for community-level interventions.  
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We find that (a) residing in agglomerated dwelling structures, (b) cooking 
indoors, (c) presence of a gap between walls and ceiling in the cooking area, and (d) 
more tree cover significantly increase children under-five’s probability of experiencing 
health symptoms in the short-term (2 weeks) recall period. On the other hand, children 
residing in households with (a) cooking area ventilation holes and (b) cemented floors 
in the cooking area are significantly less likely to experience many HAP-related health 
symptoms. 
Our finding that cement floors have a protective effect on child health 
(respiratory infection) is similar to Cattaneo et al (2008) finding of reduction in intestinal 
parasites that are not treatable with common deworming drugs found in developing 
countries, among low-income urban Mexican households. Consistent with the urban 
planning and public health literature on housing improvements being critical to health 
(Northridge et al 2003), housing improvements such as cemented floors to improve 
child health, is a key policy recommendation. Our finding that cooking indoors, relative 
to outdoor cooking, significantly increases children’s likelihood of experiencing HAP-
related illnesses, is similar to results from Langbien (2017) that outdoor cooking 
significantly reduces respiratory diseases among children aged 0-4 years, in 30 
developing countries. A second policy recommendation would be to promote outdoor 
(full or partial) cooking, during favorable seasons, in alignment with households’ 
existing cooking practices.  
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Contrary to Bruce et al (2004) findings, we find that number of windows have a 
significant positive association with respiratory infection. Our finding that number of 
windows and ventilation holes have opposing associations with the likelihood of 
children experiencing health symptoms may be due to differences in size of these 
structures, and frequency of keeping windows open. It is likely that in some 
households, though there is an active chimney, owing to poor house construction (lack 
of concrete material), smoke removed from the chimney may be circulating back into 
the house owing to porous walls. Echoing Langbien (2017), we argue for the need to 
study pollutant exposure and its impact on human health under various ventilation 
conditions and cooking locations.  
Our results of a positive relationship between distance to any road and 
prevalence of health symptoms in most models, is contrary to Venn et al (2001) finding 
that increasing proximity to a main road increases the risk of wheezing. It is likely that 
proximity to roads may not be a good proxy for traffic-related air pollutants. One 
explanation for the counter-intuitive strong positive relationship between tree cover in 
the area surrounding households and prevalence of health symptoms, contrary to 
Nowak et al (2014) findings from the United States, could be insufficient air ventilation 
and low pollutant dispersal owing to scattered non-dense vegetation (Wang et al 2014). 
Our results correspond to Musafiri et al (2011) finding that allergens (house dust mite 
and grass pollen mix) are a risk factor for asthma in rural and urban Rwanda. With 
 
131 
changing climate and rising CO2 emissions, pollen production and correspondingly 
allergenicity may increase (Ziska and Beggs 2012). In our geographically small and 
densely populated study area, it is also likely that tree cover does little to reduce HAP 
exposure, particularly CO. 
Our study is not without its limitations. First, the cross-sectional nature of our 
analysis does not allow for making causal claims. Relatedly, we are unable to control for 
children’s poor health endowment. Second, owing to binary caregiver-reported health 
symptoms, and small number of data points for exposure concentrations, we are unable 
to analyze the spatial autocorrelation in our sample. Third, though CO concentration 
coefficients are significant for some health symptoms, it is likely that caregiver’s CO 
exposure does not fully capture child’s CO exposure. Fourth, though there is no 
multicollinearity in our regression models, cooking area dimensions would have better 
characterized well-ventilated structures.  
Our analysis highlights the importance of understanding the relationship 
between structural factors about dwelling and cooking area, and child health. In areas 
of high HAP exposure as Rwanda, where there is near universal dependence on solid 
fuels for cooking, and provision of improved energy services is in its nascent stages, 
improvements in the microenvironment of the vulnerable population of under-fives, is 
central to reducing HAP-related health symptom prevalence. Housing structure 
improvements such as cemented kitchen floors and behavioral strategies of 
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encouraging outdoor cooking where possible and favorable, subject to seasonality, are 
suggestive policy interventions governments could undertake to reduce prevalence of 
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Table 4.1. Summary statistics: Baseline results  
a. Dependent Variables: Health symptoms of children under 5 years (N=694) 
HAP-related % 
Respiratory infection 12.25 
Illness with cough 36.17 
Difficulty breathing 20.17 
Dry eyes  14.41 
Other 
 
Illness with fever 29.11 
b. Independent Variables 
  Mean SD N 
Household characteristics 
Per capita monthly total expenditures (in RWF) [1 
RWF=0.0012 USD] 
56,550.80 40,584.28 529 
Household size (mean) 5.94 2.6 529 
Most used stove for cooking in the past 30 days (%) 
   
Traditional 3 stone (open fire) 2.84 
 
529 
 Portable charcoal stove  73.16 
 
529 
Fixed charcoal stove  21.17 
 
529 
Improved stove (Electric stove, gas cooker, biogas) 2.83 
 
529 
Per capita weekly charcoal use (in kgs) 2.97 2.39 529 
Main respondent characteristics 
Age (in years) 33.56 10.57 529 
Female (%) 88.66 
 
529 
Education level (%) 
   
No education 6.05 
 
529 
Pre-primary or primary  19.28 
 
529 






Awareness that smoke from burning biomass is 





Age (in months) 27.18 16.28 694 
Female (%) 49.42 
 
694 




Dwelling type (%)       
Single house 15.31 
 
529 
Multiple house 5.67 
 
529 
Group of multiple enclosed dwellings 57.66 
 
529 
Group of single enclosed dwellings 21.36 
 
529 
Cooking location (%) 
   
Fully outdoors 12.67 
 
529 
Partially outdoors 10.78 
 
529 
Kitchen structure outside dwelling 55.2 
  






Cooking area structure 
Main material used in floors of cooking area (%)       
Beaten earth 17.96 
 
529 






Kitchen roof presence (%) 70.34 
 
462 
Gap between walls and ceiling (%) 18.83 
 
462 
Number of windows (mean) 0.66 0.66 462 
Ventilation holes (%) 42.6 
 
462 
Presence of active chimney to remove smoke (%) 4.3 
 
462 
Household environmental exposure 
Nearest distance to any road (in meters) 8.83 8.09 529 
Nearest distance to paved road (in meters) 11.48 12.65 529 
Nearest distance to unpaved road (in meters) 11.92 13.47 529 
Adjacent tree cover (%) 7.33 2.23 529 
Primary caregiver* exposure concentration 
Daily average CO concentration (in ppm) 6.77 9.42 282 





















































Table 4.2. Association between microenvironment, environmental exposure & under-fives’ health symptoms 
Dependent variables 
HAP-related Other 
Respiratory infectionϮ Illness with coughϮ Difficulty breathingϮ Dry eyesϮ FeverϮ 
Explanatory variables 
Housing structure 
          
Dwelling type           
Multiple house 
0.44 0.41 0.33 0.35 0.89* 0.85 1.31** 1.32** 0.27 0.33 
(0.83) (0.86) (0.43) (0.45) (0.51) (0.52) (0.55) (0.56) (0.47) (0.49) 
Group of multiple 
enclosed dwellings 
1.89*** 1.88*** 0.57** 0.56* 1.05*** 1.03*** 0.71* 0.87** 0.64** 0.82** 
(0.61) (0.65) (0.28) (0.29) (0.36) (0.38) (0.41) (0.43) (0.31) (0.32) 
Group of single enclosed 
dwellings 
0.88 0.86 0.48* 0.48 0.63* 0.62 0.96** 1.00** 0.65** 0.63* 
(0.58) (0.62) (0.29) (0.30) (0.37) (0.39) (0.44) (0.45) (0.33) (0.34) 
Cooking location           
Partially outdoors 0.54  -0.65*  -0.17  -0.24  -0.50  
(0.51)  (0.37)  (0.46)  (0.46)  (0.41)  
Kitchen structure outside 
dwellings 
0.81 0.72 0.44 1.12** 0.72* 1.47** -0.43 0.09 0.50 1.59*** 
(0.50) (0.79) (0.33) (0.47) (0.42) (0.58) (0.42) (0.75) (0.37) (0.54) 
Cooking inside dwelling 
0.90** 0.00 0.57* 1.29*** 0.53 0.99** 0.27 0.40 0.55* 1.37*** 
(0.45) (0.48) (0.30) (0.37) (0.37) (0.43) (0.38) (0.47) (0.32) (0.40) 
Cooking area structure 
Main floor material           
Clay tiles, bricks and 
other materials 
0.66* 0.06 0.30 0.32 0.17 -0.10 0.50 -0.52 0.21 0.48 
  (0.37) (0.70) (0.31) (0.45) (0.37) (0.58) (0.42) (0.87) (0.31) (0.48) 
Cement  
-0.51 -0.78* 0.11 0.21 0.06 0.08 0.30 0.15 -0.03 0.12 
(0.39) (0.44) (0.25) (0.26) (0.29) (0.31) (0.39) (0.43) (0.25) (0.27) 
Kitchen roof  
 -1.22  0.08  -0.70  -1.32  -0.12 
 (1.00)  (0.52)  (0.71)  (1.05)  (0.62) 
Gap between walls and 
ceiling  
 0.46  0.44*  0.64**  0.35  0.45* 
 (0.37)  (0.23)  (0.27)  (0.33)  (0.25) 
Number of windows 
 0.51**  0.15  -0.06  0.39*  0.10 
 (0.23)  (0.16)  (0.19)  (0.23)  (0.17) 
Ventilation holes 
 -0.16  -0.64***  -0.69***  -0.38  -0.91*** 
 (0.31)  (0.19)  (0.24)  (0.27)  (0.21) 
Presence of active 
chimney  
 0.37  0.34  0.19  -0.47  -0.14 









Distance to nearest road  
0.03* 0.03** 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tree cover 
0.14** 0.17** 0.06 0.02 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.11** 0.12* -0.06 -0.08 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) 
Constant 
-3.67 -1.98 1.05 1.75 -0.81 -0.98 -5.77** -5.44* -1.60 -1.88 
(2.99) (3.39) (1.96) (2.24) (2.40) (2.80) (2.82) (3.17) (2.11) (2.36) 
Observations 694 612 694 612 694 612 694 612 694 612 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Ϯ Column 1 for each health outcome includes fully outdoor cooking, and Column 2 excludes fully outdoor cooking. 
1. The referent categories for dwelling type and kitchen floor are: single house and beaten earth, respectively. For cooking location, fully outdoor cooking and 
partially outdoor cooking are the referent categories in Models 1 and 2 of each symptom, respectively.  
2. Stove type controlled for as a determinant of HAP exposure.  
3. Household-level characteristics controlled for include: log of per capita total expenditure in the past 4 weeks (in RWF), household size, and per capita weekly 
charcoal use (in kg). 
4. Child characteristics controlled for include: age (in months), sex, and health card availability. Main respondent characteristics controlled for include: age, sex 










Table 4.3. Association between microenvironment, environmental and CO exposures & under-fives’ health symptoms 
Dependent variables 
HAP-related Other 
Respiratory infectionϮ Illness with coughϮ Difficulty breathingϮ Dry eyesϮ FeverϮ 
Explanatory variables           
Pollutant exposure           
Log of daily average CO 
concentration of caregiver 
0.11 0.22 0.16 0.24 0.40*** 0.48*** 0.36** 0.36* -0.08 -0.11 
(0.19) (0.25) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.15) (0.17) 
Housing structure           
Dwelling type           
Multiple house 
1.18 1.23 -0.85 -0.84 -0.02 -0.21 1.09 1.27 0.23 0.34 
(1.62) (1.86) (0.59) (0.66) (0.69) (0.81) (0.74) (0.93) (0.61) (0.70) 
Group of multiple enclosed 
dwellings 
2.69**r 2.93** r -0.20 -0.28 0.68 0.62 0.47 0.85 0.47 0.67 
(1.18) (1.34) (0.37) (0.40) (0.44) (0.46) (0.61) (0.76) (0.44) (0.53) 
Group of single enclosed 
dwellings 
2.32* 2.43* -0.47 -0.27 -0.31 -0.32 1.10 1.51* r 1.03** r 1.39** r 
(1.23) (1.43) (0.45) (0.49) (0.56) (0.57) (0.70) (0.82) (0.51) (0.58) 
Cooking location           
Partially outdoors 
0.35  -0.73  -0.18  -0.35  -0.58  
(0.77)  (0.47)  (0.61)  (0.62)  (0.57)  
Kitchen structure outside 
dwellings 
1.72** 0.99 0.48 1.11* r 0.70 1.03 0.28 1.19 1.48*** 2.66*** r 
(0.71) (1.32) (0.49) (0.61) (0.67) (0.78) (0.68) (0.89) (0.56) (0.71) 
Cooking inside dwelling 
0.84 0.12 0.35 1.43*** r 0.36 0.89 0.10 0.77 0.72 2.29*** r 
(0.67) (0.82) (0.40) (0.50) (0.52) (0.60) (0.52) (0.61) (0.45) (0.56) 
Cooking area structure           
Main floor material           
Clay tiles, bricks and other 
materials  
1.07** r 0.59 0.30 1.32* -0.05 0.51 0.98 1.02 0.92* 1.32* 
(0.53) (1.64) (0.45) (0.71) (0.58) (0.93) (0.63) (1.15) (0.51) (0.77) 
Cement 
-0.97* -1.54** r -0.09 0.20 -0.09 0.12 -0.05 -0.17 -0.47 -0.33 
(0.56) (0.69) (0.36) (0.40) (0.43) (0.47) (0.54) (0.56) (0.37) (0.42) 
Kitchen roof  
 -0.38  1.36*  0.53  -0.27  0.54 
 (2.38)  (0.76)  (1.06)  (1.50)  (0.87) 
Gap between walls and 
ceiling  
 1.29**  0.78** r  0.77** r  0.05  0.28 
 (0.54)  (0.35)  (0.38)  (0.48)  (0.44) 
Number of windows  
 0.53  -0.23  -0.14  -0.03  -0.47 
 (0.41)  (0.25)  (0.27)  (0.32)  (0.29) 
Ventilation holes  
 -0.65  -1.01*** r  -0.79** r  -0.37  -1.31*** r 








Presence of active chimney  
 1.81**  0.31  1.14  -0.56  -0.74 
 (0.70)  (0.80)  (0.76)  (1.06)  (0.80) 
Environmental exposure   
Distance to nearest road 
0.06** r 0.08*** r 0.01 0.01 0.04** 0.04** 0.04* 0.04** -0.00 -0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Tree cover 
0.24*** r 0.35*** r 0.12* 0.11 0.30*** r 0.37*** r 0.01 0.08 -0.13 -0.19 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) 
Constant 
-12.57*** -11.75** 2.67 2.18 -2.36 -1.88 -6.53* -9.76*** 1.49 -0.95 
(4.78) (5.16) (2.57) (3.10) (3.11) (3.66) (3.53) (3.69) (2.64) (3.24) 
Observations 367 321 367 321 367 321 367 321 367 321 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Ϯ Column 1 for each health outcome includes fully outdoor cooking, and Column 2 excludes fully outdoor 
cooking.  
1. Coefficients marked ‘r’ are robust in the alternate specification without log of daily average CO concentration of the caregiver.  
2. The referent categories for dwelling type and kitchen floor are: single house and beaten earth, respectively. For cooking location, fully outdoor cooking and 
partially outdoor cooking are the referent categories in Models 1 and 2 of each symptom, respectively.  
3. Stove type controlled for as a determinant of HAP exposure.  
4. Household-level characteristics controlled for include: log of per capita total expenditure in the past 4 weeks (in RWF), household size, and per capita 
weekly charcoal consumption (in kg). 
5. Child characteristics controlled for include: age (in months) and sex. Caregiver characteristic controlled for: perception about negative health impacts from 
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Table A-1. Women's bargaining power and household EH behavior adoption (Pooled 
OLS estimates): Summary of coefficients 
  Rural (N=34,560) 













0.029*** 0.011 -0.008 0.011** -0.012 




0.018*** 0.006 0.024** -0.013** 0.063*** 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) 
Autonomy score 
-0.002 0.007 0.015* 0.002 -0.002 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.142 0.285 0.237 0.069 0.270 
  Urban (N=15,332) 













0.009 -0.005 0.030*** 0.033*** -0.015* 




0.021 0.037*** -0.014 0.002 0.021** 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) 
Autonomy score 
-0.001 -0.040*** 0.028** 0.013 -0.012 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.169 0.214 0.137 0.118 0.240 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Household-
level (household size, dependency ratio, log of per capita monthly expenditure, hours of daily 
electricity access, female-headed household, family member has bank account) and individual-
level (age, years of completed education, age gap between woman and household head, education 
gap between woman and household head, has at least one child, first born is a boy, number of 






Table A-2. Women's bargaining power and EH behavior adoption by caste category 
(Household FE estimates): Summary of coefficients 
  General (N=15,444) 













0.009 0.008 -0.010 0.022 0.004 




0.005 0.004 0.017 0.013 0.018 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
Autonomy score 
0.010 -0.023 0.009 -0.012 0.008 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.683 0.758 0.788 0.621 0.667 
  OBC (N=20,120) 













0.020 0.013 0.007 0.027** -0.010 




0.024* 0.010 0.011 -0.006 0.044** 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.020) 
Autonomy score 
-0.021 -0.002 -0.005 0.000 0.004 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.017) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.695 0.800 0.786 0.602 0.677 
 SC (N=10,708) 













0.008 0.020 0.010 0.024 0.023 




0.015 -0.008 0.004 0.006 -0.011 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.027) (0.014) (0.028) 
Autonomy score 
-0.020 0.012 -0.030 -0.003 -0.013 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.011) (0.021) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.667 0.765 0.774 0.579 0.692 
 ST (N=3,620) 













0.003 0.035 0.030 0.033 -0.013 






0.005 -0.043 -0.008 -0.015 0.026 
 (0.025) (0.033) (0.044) (0.023) (0.052) 
Autonomy score -0.019 -0.015 0.005 -0.004 0.065 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.046) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.675 0.770 0.799 0.611 0.637 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Household-
level (household size, dependency ratio, log of per capita monthly expenditure, hours of daily 
electricity access, female-headed household, family member has bank account) and individual-
level (age, years of completed education, age gap between woman and household head, education 
gap between woman and household head, has at least one child, first born is a boy, number of 






Table A-3. Women's bargaining power and EH behavior adoption by zone (Household 
FE estimates): Summary of coefficients 
  North (N=10,726) 













-0.002 0.049** -0.021 0.008 0.045** 




0.013 -0.028 -0.001 0.009 0.009 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.018) (0.020) 
Autonomy score 
-0.035* -0.028 -0.007 -0.030* 0.004 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.016) (0.023) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.725 0.771 0.719 0.621 0.704 
  South (N=11,570) 













0.035 0.000 -0.000 0.023 0.016 




-0.010 -0.004 0.033 -0.012 0.011 
(0.020) (0.015) (0.029) (0.017) (0.025) 
Autonomy score 
0.006 -0.000 0.010 0.014 0.000 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.015) (0.024) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.661 0.820 0.687 0.647 0.650 
 East (N=9,080) 













-0.015 0.021 0.012 0.028 -0.038 




0.001 0.014 -0.008 -0.009 -0.047 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.023) (0.034) 
Autonomy score 
0.017 0.013 0.005 0.012 0.043* 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.026) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.772 0.811 0.797 0.626 0.708 
 West (N=7,200) 













0.006 -0.011 0.031 0.057* 0.033 
(0.032) (0.030) (0.025) (0.031) (0.029) 






(0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.025) (0.036) 
Autonomy score 
-0.004 -0.059** -0.038 -0.027 0.070** 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.636 0.737 0.763 0.579 0.601 
 Central (N=10,462) 













-0.005 0.009 0.002 -0.002 -0.033 




-0.006 0.008 0.011 -0.009 0.036 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.011) (0.030) 
Autonomy score 
0.000 0.002 0.002 0.006 -0.011 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.025) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.732 0.825 0.826 0.614 0.720 
 North-East (N=854) 













-0.075 0.034 -0.034 0.209** -0.145 




0.039 0.001 0.138** 0.146 0.072 
(0.095) (0.046) (0.062) (0.102) (0.092) 
Autonomy score 
-0.001 -0.005 0.043 0.024 -0.078 
(0.068) (0.053) (0.046) (0.075) (0.082) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.710 0.641 0.770 0.621 0.634 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Household-
level (household size, dependency ratio, log of per capita monthly expenditure, hours of daily 
electricity access, female-headed household, family member has bank account) and individual-
level (age, years of completed education, age gap between woman and household head, 
education gap between woman and household head, has at least one child, first born is a boy, 
number of hours worked in the past year, relationship to household head) factors have been 
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Factor variance 1.9036 1.7103 1.5858 1.4892 1.3733 1.3035  
Percentage of total variable 
explained 
12.69 11.40 10.57 9.93 9.16 8.69  
Survey Items        
Among your acquaintances and 
relatives, any in these professions: 
       
Health 0.8236 -0.0134 -0.0067 -0.0524 -0.0396 -0.0198 0.3365 
Education 0.8328 -0.0121 0.0081 -0.0388 -0.0247 0.0298 0.3084 
Government service 0.6440 -0.0290 0.0338 0.0762 0.1276 0.0195 0.5299 
Anyone in the household belongs to 
these groups: 
       
Mahila mandal / Women's group -0.0005 0.6474 0.0024 -0.0172 0.0928 0.0727 0.5389 
Self-Help Group -0.0525 0.7791 -0.0534 -0.0133 -0.0036 0.0021 0.4084 
Credit/Savings  0.0159 0.7219 0.0815 0.0027 -0.0298 -0.0708 0.4648 
Religious 0.0373 -0.0629 0.8517 0.0064 0.0191 0.0073 0.2731 
Caste Association -0.0193 0.0806 0.8413 0.0074 -0.0408 -0.0136 0.2818 
Youth/Sports/Reading -0.0458 0.0265 -0.0275 -0.0167 0.7810 0.0939 0.3802 
Trade Union/Business/Professional 0.0412 0.0028 0.0051 0.0216 0.7747 -0.1153 0.3877 
Any household member attended 
public meeting in the last year 
0.0263 0.1226 0.0376 0.0146 -0.0332 0.7305 0.4191 
Any household member is a 
government official 
0.0009 -0.1005 -0.0339 0.0004 0.0078 0.8142 0.3496 
People generally get along with 
each other in your community 
0.0059 0.0118 0.0259 0.8525 0.0043 0.0133 0.2703 
Castes and sub-castes in the 
community get along  
-0.0610 -0.0336 -0.0120 0.8576 0.0002 -0.0013 0.2664 
People bond to solve local problems 0.2077 0.1664 -0.1438 0.1146 -0.1240 -0.0588 0.8865 
NOTE: N=71, 236 survey responses. Factor loadings of 0.6 and above are highlighted in bold text. Loadings produced using oblique rotation following principal 









Table B-2. Determinants of social capital (Rural sample): Household FE regression results 
  Structural social capital Cognitive social capital 














Structural social capital (household-level)  
Linking/Networks score 
 0.009* 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.075*** 0.007 0.055*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) 
Female-centric bridging groups 
score 
0.018***  0.050*** 0.068*** 0.049*** -0.015*** 0.051*** 
 (0.005)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) 
Activity-based bridging groups 
score 
0.040*** 0.057***  0.066*** 0.035*** -0.002 -0.041*** 
 (0.006) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) 
Bonding groups score 0.031*** 0.058*** 0.047***  0.031*** -0.001 -0.038*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
Political participation score 0.055*** 0.035*** 0.022*** 0.029***  0.006 -0.010*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.003) 
Cognitive social capital (household-level)  
Social cohesion score 
0.017*** -0.008* -0.004 -0.002 0.007  0.046*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.003) 
Collective action 
0.196*** 0.176*** -0.137*** -0.166*** -0.063*** 0.221***  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)  
Household characteristics        
Log of per capita monthly total 
expenditures  
0.121*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.002 -0.006 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.005) 
Number of married women 
0.008 -0.026** -0.025** -0.019 -0.027* -0.008 -0.000 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.006) 
Number of household members 
0.015*** 0.023*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.025*** 0.005 -0.001 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
Highest male adult education  
0.011*** 0.003* 0.006*** 0.001 0.005** 0.004** 0.002** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 








(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Dependency ratio 
0.002 -0.028*** -0.012 -0.011 -0.015 -0.010 0.005 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.004) 
Female household head 
-0.024 -0.011 0.007 -0.046** -0.102*** 0.024 0.017* 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021) (0.010) 
Age of household head 
-0.000 -0.002*** -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001* -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Round 2 
-0.032*** 0.003 -0.010 -0.018** -0.050*** -0.045*** -0.037*** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) 
Constant -1.142*** -0.423*** -0.291*** -0.271*** -0.460*** -0.277*** 0.087* 
  (0.084) (0.098) (0.085) (0.093) (0.113) (0.094) (0.047) 
Observations 46,908 46,908 46,908 46,908 46,908 46,908 46,908 
Adjusted R-squared 0.495 0.302 0.291 0.482 0.267 0.492 0.427 
NOTE: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Community-level measures of social capital are also included for 










Table B-3. Determinants of social capital (Urban sample): Household FE regression results 
  Structural social capital Cognitive social capital 














Structural social capital (household-level)  
Linking/Networks score 
 0.009 0.076*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.015* 0.060*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) 
Female-centric bridging groups 
score 
0.022***  0.059*** 0.078*** 0.032*** 0.012 0.063*** 
 (0.008)  (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) 
Activity-based bridging groups 
score 
0.047*** 0.033***  0.072*** 0.018*** -0.003 -0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) 
Bonding groups score 0.023*** 0.060*** 0.110***  0.027*** 0.012* -0.048*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Political participation score 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.050*** 0.049***  -0.003 -0.025*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011)  (0.010) (0.006) 
Cognitive social capital (household-level)  
Social cohesion score 
0.016** 0.004 -0.005 0.016** 0.000  0.053*** 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.004) 
Collective action 
0.213*** 0.173*** -0.103*** -0.173*** -0.061*** 0.246***  
(0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018)  
Household characteristics        
Log of per capita monthly total 
expenditures  
0.190*** 0.046*** 0.087*** 0.043*** 0.035** 0.020 -0.016* 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.008) 
Number of married women 
-0.049*** -0.027 -0.023 0.001 0.000 -0.027 0.013 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.024) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.010) 
Number of household members 
0.038*** 0.034*** 0.025*** 0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.008** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
Highest male adult education  
0.008*** 0.001 0.007** 0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.000 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 








(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Dependency ratio 
0.040*** -0.036*** -0.031** -0.003 -0.011 -0.008 -0.000 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) 
Female household head 
-0.085*** -0.014 -0.042 -0.031 -0.046* 0.012 -0.002 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.038) (0.030) (0.026) (0.028) (0.016) 
Age of household head 
0.002* -0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.002* -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Round 2 
-0.059*** -0.013 -0.050*** 0.000 -0.020*** -0.074*** -0.033*** 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) 
Constant -1.851*** -0.497*** -0.656*** -0.196 -0.209* -0.393*** 0.230*** 
  (0.134) (0.121) (0.177) (0.140) (0.121) (0.135) (0.072) 
Observations 24,328 24,328 24,328 24,328 24,328 24,328 24,328 
R-squared 0.454 0.344 0.341 0.416 0.267 0.483 0.432 
NOTE: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Community-level measures of social capital are also included 
for respective household-level social capital outcomes and are positively significant (p<0.01).  
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